PEACE    WITHOUT    DISHONOR  R—WAR 
WITHOUT   HOPE.  <* 


BEING 


A  CALM  AND  DISPASSIONATE 

ENQUIRY 


INTO   THE 


QUESTION  OF  THE  CHESAPEAKE, 


AND    THE 


NECESSITY  AND  EXPEDIENCY 


WAR. 

f£<.:'*^ 


BY  A  YANKEE  FARMER: 


JBOSTON: 


$  BY  GREENOUGH  AND  STEBBIN& 
__ 


TO  THE  PUBLICK. 

IT  cannot  be  expected,  that  a  farmer  should 
display  the  ornaments  of  a  polished  style — The  au 
thor  has  aimed  only  at  perspicuity,  impartiality,  and 
truth.     A  boldness  and  freedom  characteristic  of 
the  real,  ancient  New-England  farmers,  will  be  found 
strongly  marked  in  every  part  of  this  little  essay. 
The  publick  good  is  the  author's  only  object — true 
patriotism  his  only  stimulus — and  the  promotion  of 
justice,  and  vindication  of  our  national  good  faith,  his 
only  aim. 

In  these  times  of  party  spirit  he  cannot  hope 
to  escape  censure.  His  love  of  truth — his  display 
of  our  own  errors — his  disposition  to  render  justice 
to  other  nations  will  probably  be  attributed  to  the 
basest  motives — For  such  is  too  often  the  fashion  of 
the  day — to  abuse  those  whom  we  cannot  answer. 

It  would  not  surprise  him,  if  he  should  even 
be  called  an  Old  Tory  or  a  British  hireling ;  for  he 
has  often  remarked  that  this  is  a  species  of  argument 
which  never  fails  of  success,  when  all  other  reasoning 
or  abuse  is  found  ineffectual.  But  he  shall  despise 
the  calumnies,  and  smile  at  the  attacks  of  all  the 
partizans  of  war,  a  few  of  whom,  broken  in  fortune 
or  reputation,  can  only  hope  to  rebuild  both  on  the 
ruins  of  their  Country. 


TO  THE  FARMERS,  MERCHANTS,  AND 
MECHANICKS  OF  NEW-ENGLAND. 

FELLOW    CITIZENS, 

IF  at  any  time  a  citizen  is  juftified  in  making  an  ap 
peal  to  your  underftanding,  to  your  fober  reafon — If  a  cool  and 
difpaffionate  difplay  of  your  danger,  and  your  true  interefts  be  at 
any  period  a  duty,  it  furely  becomes  fuch,  when  you  are  threatened 
with  a  calamity  by  which  your  rights,  liberties,  property,  and  lives 
are  to  be  expofed  to  the  moft  imminent  danger.  *  We  are  told  by 
the  publick  ncwfpa^crs  wmch  have  ufually  been  the  vehicles  of  the 
language  of  our  adminiftration — we  are  alfo  informed,  that  many 
very  influential  men  in  and  out  of  the  adminiftration,  concur  with 
the  publick  papers  in  declaring,  "  that  War  will  probably  take 
place,  and  that  it  is  inevitable,  unlefs  the  government  of  Great- 
Britain  mould  make  ample  reparation  for  the  attack  on  our  frigate 
the  Chefapeake."  We  alfo  know,  that  all  defcriptions  of  people  in 
Great-Britain,  however  oppofed  in  political  opinions,  concurred  in 
one  fentiment,  that  Great-Britain  never  could,  and  never  ought  to 
yield  the  principle  for  which  they  believed  that  we  contend,  the 
right  of  enlifting  and  harbouring  the  deferters  from  their  publick 
mips  of  war.  It  is  rendered  almoft  certain,  therefore,  that  Great - 
Britain,  "  while  (he  will  explicitly  difavow  the  claim  to  fearch  our  na 
tional  Jkips  of  war,  will  neverthelefs  contend,  that  we  have  no  right 
to  enlift  her  deferters,  and  protect  them  under  our  publick  flag, 
but  that  if  we  do  fo  conduct,  and  refufe  to  deliver  them  on  demand, 
me  will  retake  them  by  force,  on  a  common  jurifdiftion,  the  High 

'*  See  the  language  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  and  of  the  Aurora,  who 
eonfider  war  as  inevitable,  unlefs  Great-Britain  grants  reparation  for  the  at 
tack  on  the  Chefapeake.  Mr.  Gallatin,  Mr.  Dearborn,  and  other  publick  offi- 
'.cre  are  alledged  to  have  declared  that  war  is  to  be  expected. 


6 

teas."  If  fuch  faould  be  her  ilnal  decifion,  as  we  have  reafon  to 
fear,  fhe  cannot  punifn  Admiral  Berkeley  without  manifefl  injuftice 
to  him. 

If,  therefore,  our  adminiftration  are  fincere  in  their  determina 
tion  to  go  to  war,  unlefs  reparation  be  made  for  the  attack  on  the 
Chefapeake,  war  feems,  as  they  privately  aflert,  to  be  inevitable, 
unlefs  the  prudent  and  temperate  deliberations  of  Congrefs,  or  the 
feafonable  expreffion  of  publick  opinion,  mall  check  this  deftruc- 
tive,  and  I  may  add,  rq/h  policy.  War,  at  all  times  a  publick  ca 
lamity,  becomes  peculiarly  alarming  and  deftru&ive  to  a  nation, 
which  has  been  for  twenty-four  years  exclufively  devoted  to  the 
arts  of  peace — which  has  negle&ed  every  mean  of  national  de 
fence — which  has  devoted  none  of  its  revenues  to  a  wife  prep 
aration  for  war,  to  which  all  nations  are  occafionally  expofed. 
It  is  peculiarly  alarming  to  a  nation,  governed  by  an  adminiftra 
tion  not  only  deftitute  of  military  talents,  but  who  have  always 
avowed  their  oppofition  to  every  thing  lik^.  military  preparation, 
and  who,  while  they  have  profefled  to  rely  upon  the  moft  frail  of 
all  fupports,  the  juftice  of  nations,  and  have  therefore  neglected 
every  mean  of  preparation  or  defence,  have  moft  unfortunately 
brought  us  to  the  verge  of  a  moft  awful  precipice,  where  we  have 
no  alternative  but  either  to  plunge  headlong  to  a  certain  and  de- 
ftru&ive  fate,  or  to  retrace  our  fteps,  as  they  fay,  with  ignominy 
and  difgrace.  If  at  a  moment  fo  eventful,  and  in  a  pofition  fo  tre 
mendous,  any  friendly  hand  mould  point  out  to  us  a  path  by  which 
we  might  fave  both  our  lives  and  our  honour,  one  would  naturally 
imagine,  that  it  ought  to  excite  our  gratitude,  rather  than  our  ha 
tred — to  merit  our  thanks,  rather  than  punifhment  ;  but  other 
doctrines  feem  to  prevail.  The  friends  of  the  adminiftration, 
wounded  at  the  true  picture  of  our  fituation,  provoked  that  any 
man  mould  unanfwerably  prove  fame  errors  in  our  own  conduct 
which  diminim  the  juftice,  and  of  courfe,  the  necefiity  of  a  war, 
have  advanced  an  idea  novel  in  the  hiftory  of  free  nations,  that  *"  it 
is  treafon  to  queftion  the  juftice  or  expediency  of  a  war,"  even  be- 

*  Extract:  from  the  National  Intelligencer  in  anfvver  to  Pacificus,  a  writer  in 
the  Boflon  Centinel,  againft  the  neceffity  of  War.  This  may  be  found  in  the 
Palladium,  of  September  29,  in  a  piece  entitled  "  Modern  Liberty." 


tore  the  only  conftituted  authority  authorized  to   decide  this  ques- 
tion,  the  Legiflature,  had  convened  to  deliberate  upon  it. 

The  example  of  Great-Britain,  whole  tyrannical  principles  have 
fo  long  been  the  theme  of  popular  harangue,  one  would  think  would 
be  conclufive  on  this  point — and  that  whatever  may  be  done  'with 
Impunity  in  that  monarchical  and  fevere  government,  might  certainly 
be  permitted  in  our  free  and  enlightened  country.  It  is  well  known 
that  all  the  publick  writers  in  England,  both  before  and  after  the  de- 
cifion  of  Parliament,  as  to  the  queftion  of  war,  undertake  to  arraign 
its  juftice,  its  policy,  its  neceffity,  its  expedience,  their  own  weaknefs, 
the  means  which  they  have  of  annoying  the  enemy,  and  to  magnify 
the  refources,  power,  and  talents  of  their  foes  :  nor  can  there  be 
found,  in  a  fingle  inftance,  an  attempt  to  check  this  freedom  of  en 
quiry,  either  by  profecution  or  threats. 

If  this  example,  and  the  explicit  lan&«*ge  of  our  own  Conftitu- 
tions  were  not  fufficient  authority,  we  might  cite  an  illuftrious  man, 
whofe  opinions  a  large  part  of  the  community  would  be  unwil 
ling  to  queftion. — Prefident  Jefferfon  lays  it  down  as  an  eftablifhed 
axiom,  "  that  the  utmoft  liberty  of  the  prefs  may  be  fafely  indulg 
ed,  in  fuch  a  country  as  ours,  and  that  errors  in  opinions  can  do  no 
injury,  where  reafon  is  left  free  to  combat  them." 

If  this  doctrine  be  true  in  ordinary  cafes,  how  much  more  ftrong 
its  application  to  the  important  queftions  of  war  and  peace  ? — To 
what  terrible  confequences  would  the  tyrannical  doctrine  of  the 
National  Intelligencer,  above  quoted,  lead  us  ?  A  foreign  nation 
makes  an  attack  which  is  alledged  to  be  caufe  of  war  :  Such  an 
attack  muft  always  involve  a  queftion  of  fact,  and  a  queftion  of  law 
or  right.  If  the  opinion  of  any  particular  fet  of  men,  even  of  dig 
nified  officers,  could  be  conclufive  as  to  thefe  two  quejlions  :  If  no  pri 
vate  citizen  who  might  be  in  pofleffion  of  better  evidence  as  to  the 
faffs,  or  better  authority  as  to  the  law,  could  divulge  thefe  facts, 
and  make  known  his  principles  of  law,  it  would  follow  that  our 
Conftitution  would  be  a  dead  letter  ; — the  Legiflature  would  be 
come  mere  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  executive,  and  the  nation  might 
be  involved  in  all  the  calamities  of  war  at  the  pleafure  of  a  fmgle* 
man.  But  the  doctrine  of  the  Government  paper  goes  farther,  you 
can  not  only  not  ditcufs  the  queftion  of  right,  but  you  muft  be  filent 


as  to  the  refources  or  ability  of  the  nation  to  gain  the  object  of  the 
war.  The  opinion  of  the  Executive  is  conclufive  on  this  point  alfo. 
The  National  Intelligencer  tells  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
that  Great-Britain  has  done  an  unprovoked  aft,  which  juftifies  a  de 
claration  of  war  on  our  part ; — this  point,  it  fays,  it  is  treafon  in  any 
body  to  difprove. — It  adds,  that  this  war  would  be  expedient,  be- 
caufe  "  we  can  bring  Great-Britain  to  our  feet.  We  can  ruin  her 
manufacturers  ;  we  can  ftarve  her  colonies  ;  we  can  take  Canada 
and  Nova-Scotia  :  while  the  injury  will  be  trifling  to  ourfelves,  as 
we  can  fupply  ourfelves  as  plentifully  with  foreign  goods  by  prizes 
we  mall  take,  as  we  are  now  fupplied  by  commerce  ;  and  our  pro 
duce  will  meet  as  ready  a  fale  in  war  as  in  peace." 

But  any  attempt  to  difprove  thefe  propofitions,  efpecially  if  made 
with  truth  and  ability,  it  declares  to  be  the  high  offence  of  treafon, 
inafmuch  as  it  tends  to  piov«  the  opinions  of  great  men  erroneous, 
and  to  difcourage  the  people  from  undertaking  a  war,  which  thofe 
great  men  have  refolved  to  wage. 

Braving  all  the  dangers  to  which  thofe  writers  are  expofed,  who 
venture  to  give  light  to  the  people,  on  this  moft  interefting  fubject, 
and  defpifing  the  threats  of  profecution  for  treafon,  I  mail  attempt 
to  develope  the  principles,  to  trace  the  hiftory,  and  to  expofe  the 
facts  in  relation  to  our  alledged  caufe  of  complaint  againft  Eng 
land  ; — to  examine  our  own  conduct,  and  the  allegation  fo  often 
made,  that  the  attack  on  our  National  flag,  was  wholly  without 
provocation  ;  and  laftly,  to  confider  the  expediency  of  war,  in 
which  will  be  involved,  its  objects — the  profpect  of  fuccefs  or  de 
feat  ;  our  refources,  and  means  of  annoyance  of  our  propofed  ene 
my  ;  and  the  power,  fituation,  and  interefts  of  the  nation  with 
whom  we  are  about  to  contend  ;  and  I  mall  conclude  with  confid- 
ering  the  effects  of  fuch  a  war,  whether  it  prove  fuccefsful  or  dif- 
graceful  upon  our  general  politicks,  interior  and  exterior,  and  upon 
thofe  great  and  permanent  interefts,  which  ought  never  to  be  over 
looked  when  we  are  weighing  minor  queftions,  or  debating  upon 
injuries  and  incidents  which  do  not  affect,  or  compromife  our  wel 
fare  or  exiftence. 

It  will  not  be  denied,  that  on  the  24th  day  of  June  laft,  when 
the  attack  was  made  on  the   Chefapeake,  the  relations  between 


Great- Britain  and  the  United  States,  were  thofe  of  peace  and 
amity. — This  is  proved  by  the  declarations  of  the  Prefident  to 
Congrefs,  and  the  communications  of  our  Minifters  at  the  Court  of 
Great-Britain,  which  were  laid  before  that  honourable  body.*  It 
is  farther  proved  by  the  language  of  the  Britifli  Minifters  in  and  out 
of  Parliament,  and  by  the  circumftance  of  our  Minifters  extraordi-' 
nary  having  figned  a  Treaty  of  Amity,  which  fettled  all  our  differ 
ences,  except  the  {ingle  one,  of  the  right  of  fearch  of  merchant 
mips  for  Britifh  feamen,  and  on  which  point,  it  is  faid  from  good 
authority,  Great-Britain  was  ready  and  offered  to  yield  the  right 
of  fearch  except  as  it  refpe&ed  the  narrow  feas,  or  that  portion 
of  the  fea  which  immediately  furrounds  Great-Britain,  and  where 
the  danger  of  the  lofs  of  their  feamen,  who  are  their  only  defence, 
was  peculiarly  imminent, 

It  cannot  be  doubted,  therefore,  that  peace,  fo  much  to  be  de- 
fired  by  this  country,  would  not  have  been  interrupted,  and  that 
our  profitable  neutrality  would  have  been  continued,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  affair  of  the  Chefapeake,  which  cannot  be  too  much 
deplored.  The  queftion,  therefore,  is  limited  to  the  examination 
of  the  caufes  of  that  unfortunate  act,  and  of  the  confequences  which 
ought  to  refult  from  it. 

As  a  great  portion  of  the  irritation  which  has  been  produced, 
excited,  and  encouraged,  has  proceeded  from  an  ignorance  of  the 
fafts  which  preceded  and  accompanied  that  affair,  it  will  be  ufeful, 
before  we  enter  into  an  inveftigation  of  the  Law  of  Nations  upon 
this  fubjecl,  to  fettle,  as  far  as  poffible,  ihefefafls. 

In  the  fummer  of  1806,  a  French  fquadron  of  line  of  battle 
(hips  and  frigates  having  met  with  a  gale  upon  our  coafts,  a  part  of 
them  took  refuge  in  the  Chefapeake,  to  melter  themfelves  from  their 
enemies.  This  rendered  it  neceffary  for  Great-Britain  to  detach  a 
fquadron  to  watch  the  motion  of  their  enemies,  and  they  accord 
ingly,  as  they  lawfully  might,  took  their  ftation  in  Hampton 
Roads.  By  the  Law  of  Nations,  and  the  principles  of  an  impar 
tial  neutrality,  we  owed  to  both  thefe  fquadrons,  equal  protection. 
While  we  permitted  the  French  to  repair  and  refit  their  mips,  re- 
See  the  Prefident's  Communications  to  Congrefs,  on  this  fubjedfc. 

B 


10 

claim  their  deferters,  and  to  prepare  to  encounter  their  enemies,  thV? 
laws  of  hofpitality  equally  demanded,  that  we  mould  allow  equal 
privileges  and  indulgence  to  the  Britifh  fquadron,  and  more  eipe- 
cially  that  we  mould  not  countenance  or  encourage  any  meafures 
by  which  their  means  of  encountering  their  enemy  mould  be,  while 
they  were  under  our  protection,  weakened. 

*On  the  7th  day  of  March  laft,  five  Br'ttt/b  feamen  belonging  to 
the  Britifh  floop  of  war  Halifax,  Lord  James  Townfhend  command 
er,  while  employed  in  weighing  the  anchor,  rofe  upon  their  officer, 
threatened  to  murder  him,  and  made  off  with  the  boat  to  the  Amer 
ican  fhore,  where  they  landed.  Their  names  were,  Richard  Hu 
bert,  fail-maker,  born  in  Liverpool  ;  Henry  Saunders,  yeoman  of 
the  meets,  born  in  Greenock  ;  Jenkin  Ratford,  born  in  London  ; 
George  North,  captain  of  the  main-top,  born  in  Kinfale  ;  and 
William  Hill,  born  in  Philadelphia  ;  who  entered  in  a  Britifh  port 
voluntarily,  viz.  in  Antigua. 

The  facts  of  their  birth  and  citizenfhip  were  taken  from  the  fhip's 
books,  and  were  fworn  to  have  been  their  own  declarations  at  the 
time  of  their  entry  on  board  the  fhip. 

The  nature  of  this  evidence  is  conclufive,  and  itsfazmefs  isjtrongly 
marked  by  their  not  attempting  to  conceal  the  fact,  that  one  of  the 
iivewas  born  in  Philadelphia. 

The  very  day  after  their  landing,  they  were  enlifted  as  part  of 
the  crew  of  the  United  States  fhip  Chefapeake.  Perhaps  this  wa;; 
done  ignorantly,  though  it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  an  Englifh- 
man,  and  efpecially  a  Scotchman  and  Irifhrnan,  may  be  almojl  as 
readily  difcerned  from  an  American,  by  thofe  who  are  converfant 
with  failors,  as  a  black  man  can  be  diftinguifhed  from  a  white  one. 
It  is  certain,  however,  that  thefe  men  could  not  have  been  pofleffcd 
of  American  protections.  The  very  day  after  the  enliflment,  Lord 
James  Townfhend  demanded  thefe  men  of  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  the 
recruiting  officer  of  the  Chefapeake.  The  government  of  the 
United  States  had,  as  Captain  Barren  afferts,  ordered  the  recruiting 
officers  not  to  enlift  Brlti/h  deferters.  Thefe  deferters  were  not  at 

*  For  thefe  fa&s,  fee  the  affidavits  of  the  commander  and  officers  of  the 
Halifax,  printed  in  the  Trial  of  Jenkin  Ratford,  one  of  the  mutineers,  and  re 
printed  at  Bofton. 


11 

this  time  on  board  the  fhip,but  at  the  rendezvous.  It  naturally  oc 
curs  to  afk,  why  did  not  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  in  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  the  government,  immediately  difcharge  thefe  men  ?  If  he 
had  enlifted  them  ignorantly,  the  /pint,  nay,  the  letter  of  his  orders, 
obliged  him  to  difcharge  them  as  foon  as  he  knew  from  the  higheft 
authority,  their  commanding  officer,  that  they  were  deferters  from  his 
fliip.  Many  honefl  well  meaning  men  have  contended,  that  the 
word  of  a  publlck  officer  ought  to  be  refpe&ed. 

This  is  an  excellent  general  principle,  and  the  obfervance  of  it 
would  tend  very  much  to  preferve  the  peace  of  nations  :  but  we 
fliould  not  forget  that  this  rule  has  a  double  application.  It  op 
erates  as  much  in  favour  of  the  officers  of  other  nations  as  of  our 
own.  When,  therefore,  Lord  James  Townfhend  pledged  his  word 
to  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  that  the  men  whom  he  had  enlifted,  contrary 
to  the  orders  of  our  government,  were  his  failors,  and  that  the 
Britifh  government  had  a  property  in  tkeir  ferviccs,  it  was  as  much 
the  duty  of  Lieutenant  Sinclair  to  give  full  faith  to  the  word  of 
Captain  Townfhend,  as  it  was  the  duty  of  Captain  Humphreys  to 
give  credit  to  the  declaration  of  Captain  Barren: — it  was  ftill 
ilronger  ; — Lieutenant  Sinclair  did  not,  could  not  know  that  the 
declaration  of  Lord  Townfhend  was  untrue  ;  but  Captain  Hum 
phreys  did  know  that  the  declaration  of  Commodore  Barron  was 
7anfounded,  and  he  turned  out  to  be  right  in  the  fact. 

Lieutenant  Sinclair  made  an  evafive  anfwer  to  the  application  of 
Captain  Townfhend,  and  did  not  deliver  or  difcharge  the  men.  An 
application  was  then  made  to  Captain  Decatur,  who  referred  him 
back  to  Sinclair.  The  Britifh  Conful  applied  to  the  Mayor  of 
Norfolk  for  thefe  men,  but  without  effed— and  laftly,  the  Britifh 
Minifler  applied  to  our  government,  who  replied,  that  they  had  on 
a  former  occaficm  ftated  their  reafons  for  riot  complying  with  their 
requeft,  and  that  moreover  the  men  were  Americans. 

Thefe  men,  who,  with  the  exception  of  Hill,  were  all  native  Brlt- 
t/hfeamen,  and  had  no  claims  from  refidence  or  other  caufes  on  our 
proteaion,  were  all  continued  on  board  the  Chefapeake,  while  at 
Wafhington,  under  the  eye  of  our  government.  No  meafures  ap 
pear  to  have  been  taken  to  afcertain  their  claims  to  our  proteaion. 
No  evidence  down  to  this  day  has  ever  been  publifhed  in  relation  ta 


either  of  thefe  men.  We  muft  conclude,  therefore,  that  they  are,  a» 
the  Britifh  have  proved  under  oath,  all  native  Britiih  feamen,  except 
William  Hill.  It  cannot  be  pretended  that  the  government  are  in 
poffeffion  of  evidence  in  refpeft  to  them  which  it  does  not  think  it  im 
portant  to  publiih,  becaufe  we  know  that  they  have  been  at  great 
pains  to  collect  and  publifh  the  evidence  with  refpect  to  three  other 
feameti)  whofe  cafe  has  no  connection  with  the  caufe  of  the  attack 
on  the  Chefapeake. 

Thefe  feamen  were  among  the  crew  of  the  Chefapeake  at  the  pe 
riod  of  the  faid  four  leveral,  folemn  demands,  and  continued  on 
board  till  the  fliip  failed  down  the  river,  when  four  of  them  deferted. 
The  fifth,  Jenkin  Ratford,  remained  on  board  till  after  the  laft  de 
mand  made  by  Captain  Humphreys,  and  to  which  demand  Captain 
Barron  replied,  that  "  he  knew  of  no  fuch  men  as  Captain  Hum 
phreys  defcribed."  After  the  action,  Ratford  was  found  hid  in 
the  coal  hole  of  the  Chefapcako,  and  has  fmce  been  tried,  found 
guilty  of  mutiny,  and  executed.  He  confeifed  himfelf  to  be  a  na 
tive  of  London,  that  he  had  entered  his  Britannick  Majefty's  fer- 
vice  voluntarily  ;  that  he  was  perfuaded  to  enter  on  board  the 
Chefapeake,  in  order  to  protect  himfelf  from  the  fearch  of  his  offi 
cers,  and  that  on  his  entering,  he  was  afked  if  he  had  not  a  fecond 
name  ;  that  he  thereupon  entered  by  the  name  of  Wilfon.  As  foon 
as  thefe  repeated  demands  and  refufals  were  known  to  the  com 
mander  in  chief,  Admiral  Berkeley,  finding,  as  he  alledges,  that  the 
feamen  of  the  Britifh  fleet  were  deferting  every  day,  he  iffued  the 
order  referred  to  in  the  note  below,*  in  fubftance  directing  the  offi 
cers  of  his  Majefty's  mips  under  his  command,  to  require  permif- 
iion  of  the  Captain  of  the  Chefapeake  to  fearch  that  fhip,  on  the 
high  feas,  for  the  deferters  referred  to  in  faid  order,  and  to  proceed 
and  fearch  for  the  fame,  at  the  fame  time  offering  a  like  and  recip 
rocal  permiffion  to  the  American  officers.  Captain  Humphreys,  of 
the  Leopard,  was  entrufted  with  the  execution  of  this  order,  and 
the  manner  in  which  he  executed  it,  is  too  well  known  to  need  rep- 
ctition.  Two  or  three  remarks,  however,  may  not  be  amifs,  as  an 
opportunity  will  not  again  occur  in  the  courfe  of  the  propofed  dif- 

Advrnral  Berkeley's  order,  printed  in  the  Trial  of  Jenkin  Ratford. 


13 

cuflion  : — 1ft,  That  another  formal  demand  was  made  of  their  own 
feamen,  by  the  Britifh  officers,  before  the  laft  alternative  was  re- 
forted  to  ;  that  this  demand  was  couched  in  terms  fo  polite  and 
refpe&ful,  that  it  would  not  have  been  beneath  the  dignity  of  Cap 
tain  Barren  to  have  met  it  with  equal  politenefs,  and  to  have  ftated 
the  cafe  truly  to  Captain  Humphreys,  that  three  of  the  men  de 
manded  had  efcaped,  and  that  the  fourth  he  was  ready  to  deliver  ; 
this  would  probably  have  finifhed  this  unhappy  affair.  2d,  That 
nothing  in  the  anfwer  of  Captain  Barron,  is  a  fufficient  excufe  for 
his  not  delivering  up  Jenkin  Ratford,  one  of  the  mutineers,  then 
on  board  the  Chefapeake. 

The  reafon  affigned  to  the  Britifh  officer,  that  he  was  ordered 
not  to  fuffer  his  crew  to  be  muftered,  by  any  but  his  own  officers, 
does  not  apply — There  was  no  neceffity  of  mujlering  them  at  all. 
At  that  time  it  was  well  known,  it  muji  have  been  known  on  board 
the  Chefapeake,  who  the  men  demanded  were.  And  he  declares 
that  he  had  pofitive  orders  from  the  Govefnment  not  to  enlift 
deferters,  which  amounted  to  an  order  to  deliver  them,  if  he  had 
enlifted  them  ignorantly. 

He  might  therefore  have  obeyed  both  thefe  orders  of  the  Govern 
ment,  and  have  preferved  the  honour  of  our  flag ;  and  what  is  more, 
the  honour,  faith,  and  reputation  of  our  officers.  By  fending  on 
board  the  Britifh  fhip,  Jenkin  Ratford,  of  London,  a  mutineer,  and 
deferter,  and  accompanying  it  with  a  declaration  on  his  honour, 
that  the  others  had  deferted  from  the  Chefapeake,  he  would  have 
fatisfied  Capt.  Humphreys,  would  have  fubftantially  obeyed  the 
order  of  our  Government  not  to  enlift  deferters,  and  have  prevent 
ed  the  unhappy  cataftrophe. 

3dly.  The  meannefs  of  many  of  our  publick  papers  and  refolu- 
tions,  in  representing  this  attack  as  cowardly,  and  affaffin-like,  can* 
n,ot  be  too  much  condemned  by  every  candid  and  ingenuous  mind- 

The  Leopard  was  a  50  gun  fhip,  and  carried  a  fmaller  number 
of  men  than  the  Chefapeake  ;  the  Chefapeake  was  a  large  44, 
which  our  officers  have  often  declared  equal  to  a  Britifh  64.  So 
far  from  the  Britifh  officers  knowing,  that  the  Chefapeake  was  un 
prepared,  it  turns  out  by  the  charges  of  our  own  officers  againft 
Barron,  that  me  was  fully  prepared.  Indeed  the  Britifh  officers 


14 

are  faid  to  have  avowed  to  ours,  before  fhe  failed,  that  they  were, 
mflru&ed  to  obtain  thefe  men  by  force  if  they  were  not  given 
up.  Our  own  officer  after  having  refolved  to  defend  his  fhip, 
ought  to  have  nailed  his  flag  to  the  maft,  and  to  have  funk  his 
adverfary,  or  to  have  gone  down  himfelf  with  his  flag  undifhon- 
oured.  It  is  the  difgrace  which  this  conduct  feems  to  fix 
upon  us,  which  makes  us  feel  fo  pungently. 

Had  Capt.  Barron  vindicated  our  national  honour  as  he  ought 
to  have  done,  we  mould  have  feen  this  affair  in  a  very  different 
light.  We  mould  have  acknowledged  that  we  were  wrong  in  the 
principle  of  enltfting  their  feamen,  but  we  might  have  added,  that  no 
nation  mall  infult  our  flag  with  impunity  :  we  need  not  indeed 
have  faid  this  ;  the  faft  would  fpeak  a  plainer  language. 

After  the  colours  of  the  United  States  fhip  had  been  ftruck, 
the  Britifh  officers  proceeded  to  fearch  for  their  deferters. 

The  refult  of  this  fearch  was  this  : — they  found  Jenkin  Rat- 
ford,  one  of  the  feamen  demanded — and  John  Strachan,  Daniel 
Martin,  and  William  Ware,  three  other  deferters,  whom  they  did 
not  fufpedl  had  been  enlifted  ;  who  were  not  contained  in  the  or 
der  of  Admiral  Berkeley,  but  who  are  admitted  by  our  Govern 
ment  to  have  been  deferters  from  the  Britifh  frigate  Melampus. 
Thefe  men  were  no  more  the  caufe  of  the  attack,  than  if  the 
Britifh  had  found  an  anchor  on  board,  which  had  been^o/^«  from 
their  fhip,  but  which  they  could  never  expeEl  to  find  on  board  one 
of  our  publick  mips.  They  alfo  found  twelve  other  Britifh  fea 
men,  who  not  being  deferters,  they  fuffered  to  remain.  It 
turned  out  therefore,  that  there  were  on  board  the  Chefapeake, 
when  fhe  was  at  Wafnington,  five  Britifh  deferters  from  the  Hali 
fax,  three  deferters  from  the  Melampus,  and  twelve  other  Britifh 
feamen. 

The  Britifh  officers  took  away  the  Jingle  feaman  whom  they 
found  of  thofe  demanded,  and  the  three  other  deferters  from  the 
Melampus,  whom  they  were  not  ordered  to  take,  becaufe  they  were 
not  known  to  have  been  on  board. 

The  aftonifhment  and  indignation  of  every  American  was  excited 
foon  after,  by  the  Prefident's  declaration,  "  that  the  feamen  de 
manded  had  been  previoufly  afcertained  to  be  native  citizens  of  the 


15 

United  States." — That  the  Britifh  Admiral  fliould  have  the  hardi 
hood  to  demand,  and  to  order  the  retaking  by  force,  native  citizens 
of  America,  was  fo  incredible  in  itfelf,  that  fome  writers  ventured 
to  doubt  it.  This  drew  out  the  evidence  on  both  fides,  and  it 
turns  out  mojl  unequivocally,  that  the  Prefident  was  grofsly  mifin- 
formed.  No  doubt  thefe  high  officers  muft  rely  upon  the  veracity 
and  accuracy  of  inferior  agents. — Unhappily  the  fource  of  the 
Prefident's  information  was  impure  ;  and  a  publick,  folemn,  nation 
al  declaration,  by  the  negligence  or  falfehood  of  fome  fubaltern  offi 
cer,  turns  out  to  be  unfupported  by  faffs. 

The  cafe  was  this  : — The  Proclamation  ftates,  that  the  aft  of 
the  Britifh  officers  was  fo  much  the  more  unpardonable,  "  as  it 
had  been  previoufly  afcertained  that  the  feamen  demanded,  were 
native  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

The  ejence  of  the  criminality  confifted  in  demanding  native  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States,  and  in  attacking  a  fhip  of  war  for  not 
delivering  fuch  citizens.  Now  it  turns  out  that  all  the  feamen  de 
manded,  were  native  Britifh  feamen,  and  therefore,  all  this  exagger 
ated  point  of  criminality  falls  to  the  ground. 

When  the  publick  called  upon  the  Government  for  the  evidence 
of  the  citizenfhip  of  thefe  deferters,  the  Prefident,  it  is  prefumed, 
called  on  the  inferior  officers,  on  whose  report  he  had  made  the 
declaration  ;  and  they,  in  order  to  cover  their  errors,  inftead  of  fur- 
nifhing  the  evidence  of  the  citizenfhip  of  the  deferters  from  the 
Halifax,  who  were  demanded,  gave  the  documents  in  relation  to  the 
deferters  from  the  Melampus,  who  were  not  demanded,  but  who 
being  found  among  the  crew  of  the  Chefapeake,  were  taken  out. 
Thefe  documents  were  publifhed  and  applied  to  fupport  the  pro 
clamation,  and  to  prove  that  the  Britifh  officers  made  an  attack 
for  the  recovery  of  native  Americans.  This  is  now  known  to  be 
falfe.  For  an  explication  of  this  point,  fee  the  notes.* 

*  Seamen  who  deferted  from  the  Halifax,  Lord  James  Townfhend,  and  who 
were  fo  often  demanded,  and  for  whom  the  attack  on  the  Chefapeake  was  made, 

•viz.  Richard  Hubert,  of  Liverpool,")    demanded,  but  efcaped  from  the  Chefa- 
Henry  Saunders,  of  Greenock,  I  do.  do.  [peake, 

Jenkin  Ratford,  of  London,        >  demanded  and  taken. 
George  North,  of  Kinfale,  I    demanded,  but  efcaped  from  the  Chefa- 

William  Hill,  of  Philadelphia,  j          do.  do.  [peake, 

[See  the-  continuation  of  tins  note  in  tie  next  fage.^ 


16 

In  fact  no  evidence  has  yet  been,  and  no  evidence  eve?  can  be 
adduced  to  prove  that  the  feamen  demanded,  and  whofe  protection 
by  us  was  ihefole  caufe  of  attack,  were  Americans  ;  becaufe  they 
were  and  have  been  proved  by  the  higheft  evidence  to  be  native 
Brittft)  fcamen* 

But  fince  the  cafe  of  the  men  taken  from  the  Melampus,  har 
been  blended  with  that  of  the  others,  let  us  fee  how  the  facts  turn 
out  as  to  them. 

Inftead  of  fupporting  the  proclamation,  as  to  the  fact  of  their 
having  been  afcertained  to  be  native  citizens,  it  turns  out,  that  Capt, 
Barron  had  fimply  taken  the  Jlory  of  the  culprits  :  It  turns  out 
further,  that  one  of  them  was  born  at  Bonaire,  in  Spanifh  Amer 
ica,  and  was  not  even  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  ;  that  the  two 
others  were  black  men,  born  (laves  in  Maryland,  and  ftrictly  there 
fore,  not  native  citizens,  though  natives.  That  they  all  told  Capt. 
Barron  a  falfehood,  in  Hating  that  they  had  been  impreffed  on 
board  the  Melampus,  becaufe  they  referred  to  their  former  mafter, 
Capt.  Crafts,  who  ftates,  that  he  fufpected  and  charged  them  with 
theft  in  England,  that  they  therefore  abfconded,  and  in  order  to 
protect  themfelves,  entered  on  board  the  Melampus  voluntarily. 
Capt.  Crafts,  pleafed,  probably,  with  getting  rid  of  fuch  rafcals, 
never  demanded  them  either  of  the  Captain  of  the  Melampus,  or  of 
the  Britifh  Government,  after  they  were  enlifted,  and  they  remain 
ed  on  board  that  frigate  till  they  again  deferted  from  her  in  our 
country. 

Some  honeft  men  doubt,  whether  the  Britifh  officers  had  a  right 
to  enlift  thefe  men  ;  and  if  they  had,  whether  they  could  reclaim 
them  from  us,  after  defertion. 

Protefting  that  it  has  no  connexion  with  the  affair  of  the  Chefa- 
peake,  they  not  being  the  men  demanded,  I  would  obferve,  that  it  is 
not  competent  for  our  Government  to  deny  the  right  of  our  citi 
zens  to  enter  into  foreign  fervice,  in  a  foreign  jurifdiction,  becaufe 
1ft.  The  prefent  adminiftration  and  all  the  party  now  in  power  iw 


Seamen  deferted  from  the  Melampus, 

John  Strachan,  of  Maryland,1^    not  demanded,  but  taken. 
William  Ware,  of  Maryland, C  do.  do. 

Daniel  Martin,  of  Bonaire,     J  do.  do> 


17 

the  United  States,  oppofed  the  plan  of  the  Wamington  adminiftra- 
tion  to  prohibit  fuch  conduct,  and  they  contended  that  a  citizen  in 
time  of  peace,  might  expatiate  himfelf  at  pleafure.  The  famous 
example  of  Commodore  Barney  muft  be  in  every  one's  recollection. 

2dly.  The  Act  of  Congrefs  prohibiting  our  citizens  from  enter 
ing  into  foreign  fervice  within  our  own  territory  is  a  ftrong,  and  al- 
moft  irrefiftible  implication  that  they  may  do  it  in  other  countries. 

3dly.  The  late  anfwer  of  our  Government  to  the  Britifh  Min- 
ifter,  that  we  cannot  ftop  to  enquire  of  what  country  a  man  is  a 
fubject,  when  he  offers  himfelf  to  enlift  as  a  foldier  or  failor,  is  a 
perfect  anfwer  to  us  upon  that  fubject.  And  our  practice  from  the 
commencement  of  our  Government  to  this  day,  of  inviting,  and 
naturalizing  the  citizens  of  all  countries,  even  of  nations  at  war, 
ought  to  make  us  perfectly  filent  on  this  topick. 

4thly.  If  a  man  has  a  right  to  enlift  in  a  foreign  country,  and 
does  fo  enlift,  figns  the  articles  of  war,  receives  the  bounty  and 
wages,  he  becomes  to  all  intents  and  purpofes  a  fubject  of  his 
newly  adopted  country,  and  all  our  claims  over  him,  and  his  to  our 
protection  abfolutely  ceafe.  To  illuftrate  this  cafe,  let  us  fuppofe 
that  Capt.  Barney  had  delivered  up  the  frigate  which  he  command 
ed,  to  the  Britim  in  the  Chefapeake,  and  had  landed,  and  the 
French  Government  had  demanded  the  delivery  of  him  for  the 
purpofe  of  punifliment,  and  had  threatened  us  with  war,  in  cafe  of 
refufal,  is  there  any  doubt  that  we  mould  have  delivered  him  up  ? 
And  mould  we  not  be  juftly  deemed  accomplices  of  his  crime,  if 
we  mould  refufe  ? 

'Now  the  cafe  of  thefe  two  black  men,  is  precifely  the  fame  with 
that  of  Capt.  BarntTy. — Mr.  Jefferfon  calls  them  citizens  of  the 
United  States  ;  if  fo,  their  right  of  expatriation  is  as  great  as  that  of 
Capt.  Barney,  or  of  Mr.  Jefferfon  ;  and  when  once  legally  entered 
into  foreign  fervice,  if  they  defert,  they  are  as  much  reclaimable  as 
either  of  the  others  would  be. 

I  have  briefly  confidered  the  cafe  of  thefe  men  belonging  to  the 
Melampus,  becaufe  fome  people  have  or  pretend  to  have,  fcruples 
en  this  fubject ;  but  I  repeat,  that  the  cafe  of  thefe  men  forms  no 
part  of  the  real  queftion. 
C 


18 

It  will  conilitutc  no  part  of  the  difcufiion  between  the  two 
countries  ;  it  does  not  affedt  the  merit  or  demerit  of  Admiral 
Berkeley  :  He  ordered  his  officers  to  take  Richard  Hubert,  Jen- 
kin  Ratford,  and  George  North,  thefe  were  all  native  Englifhmen. 
His  officers  could  find  but  one  of  thofe  men,  but  they  found  three 
others,  whom  they  had  no  orders  to  take,  but  who  were  deferters. 
If  they  were  miftaken  in  thefe  three  laft  men,  (which  they  were 
not)  and  had  no  right  to  take  them,  it  does  not  render  the  order 
for  taking  the  real  Englifhmen,  and  the  a&ual  execution  of  it  by 
feizing  one  of  them  lefs  correct.  My  brother  farmers,  will  under- 
ftand  this  better,  if  I  put  a  cafe  jujl  Me  it. — A  Sheriff  has  a  war 
rant  to  fearch  a  neighbour's  barn  for  two  ftolen  horfes,  fufpe&ed 
to  be  concealed  there  :  He  enters,  and  finds  one  of  thejlolen  horfes, 
and  he  alfo  takes  a  cow,  which  he  thinks  was  ftolen  from  another 
neighbour.  Suppofe  it  mould  turn  out  that  he  mould  be  wrong 
as  to  the  cow  ;  does  it  render  the  warrant  for  the  horfe  illegal, 
when  he  really  found  one  of  the  ftolen  horfes  concealed  there  ? 

Thus,  then  I  have  confidered,  and  ftated  all  the  fads  as  yet 
afcertained,  as  to  the  caufe  of  this  attack  ;  and  it  appears,  that  four 
native  Britljh  feamen  and  deferters,  who  deferted  in  our  territory, 
Were  contrary  to  orders  enlifted  and  entered  in  our  (hip  Chefapeake  ; 
that  they  were  demanded  of  the  inferiour  officers,  and  laftly  of  the 
Government,  and  were  not  delivered  ; — that  a  forcible  attack  was 
made  to  recover  thefe  men  ;  and  though  three  of  them  had  efcaped, 
one  was  actually  found  concealed  on  board  of  our  (hip  j  and  that 
twenty  Britlflj  failors  were  found  to  have  been  entered  on  board  of 
her. 

I  mail  now  proceed  to  examine  the  principles  of  the  Law  of 
Nations  on  this  subjeft,  and  whether  we  were  in  good  faith  obliged 
to  deliver  up  thefe  deferters  ? 

The  firft  queftion  which  prefents  itfelf  on  this  point  is,  how  far 
the  fubje&s  of  a  nation  in  time  of  war,  have  a  right  to  expatriate 
themfelves,  or  to  enlift  in  foreign  fervice,  even  in  ordinary  cafes, 
where  they  have  not  entered  into  fpecial  engagements  with  their 
Sovereign  ? — On  this  point  all  the  writers  on  the  Law  of  Nations, 
moil  of  whom  are  on  the  fide  of  freedom,  and  the  privileges  of  the 
citizen,  agree,  that  fubjefts  not  in  publick  employ,  cannot  expa- 


19 

triate  themfelves  while  their  nation  is  at  'war.  Burlamaqui,  Vattel, 
Grotius,  and  Puffendorf,  all  hold  the  fame  opinions,  but  as  it  would 
exceed  the  limits  of  this  eflay,  to  quote  the  opinions  of  all  of  them 
at  large,  I  mail  confine  myfelf  to  thofe  of  Grotius,  a  Dutch  writer, 
whofe  excellent  treatife  on  the  rights  of  War  and  Peace,  has  been 
confidered  a  flandard  work  upon  this  fubject. 

In  the  XXIVth  fection  of  his  Vth  chapter,  he  lays  it  down  as  a 
general  principle,  that  the  fubjects  of  any  nation  may  change  their 
country  at  pleafure,  to  which  general  rule,  he  makes  the  following 
exceptions  : — "  And  yet  herein  alfo,  we  are  to  fubmit  to  natural 
equity,  that  it  mould  not  be  lawful  when  the  publick  was  damnified 
by  it. — For  as  Proculus  obferves,  always  not  that  which  is 
profitable  to  fame  one  of  the  fociety  is  ufually  to  be  obferved,  but 
what  is  expedient  for  the  whole. 

"  But  it  is  expedient  for  the  whole,  that  in  cafe  any  great  debt 
be  contracted,  no  citizen  flmuld  forfake  the  city,  until  he  have 
firfl  paid  his  proportion  of  it,  Alfo,  if  upon  confidence  of  the  number 
of  their  citizens,  they  have  begun  a  <war,  but  efpecially  if  they  are 
in  danger  to  be  bejieged,  no  citizen  ought  to  forfake  it,  till  he  have 
firfl  provided  a  perfon  as  able  as  himfelf  to  defend  the  Common 
wealth." 

In  this  point  all  the  writers  on  the  Law  of  Nations,  are  agreed, 
and  if  they  had  been  filent,  the  dictates  of  common  fenfe  and  natur 
al  equity,  and  the  firfl  principles  of  the  focial  compact,  would  have 
decided  the  queftion. 

In  the  cafe  of  Great-Britain,  all  the  reafoning  of  Grotius,  applies 
to  the  contefl  in  which  me  is  now  engaged. 

It  will  not  be  denied  that  me  has  undertaken  this  war  "  in  con 
fidence  of  the  number,  and  ability  of  her  fubjects  ;"  nor  will  it  be 
queflioned,  "  that  fne  is  not  only  in  danger,  but  is  actually  threat 
ened  with  being  befieged"  by  the  mofl  formidable  power  which  the 
world  has  ever  feen.  We  cannot  therefore,  refift  the  conclufion 
of  Grotius,  that  no  private  citizen  of  Great-Britain  has  a  right  to 
forfake  his  country,  without  providing  a  perfon  equally  able  to  de 
fend  the  Commonwealth. 

If  this  doctrine  is  true  with  refpect  to  private  citizens,,  who  are 
only  bound  by  a  tacit  and  implied  contract,  how  much  flronger  is 


the  principle  when  applied  to  perfons  in  publick  employ,  bound  by 
an  exprefs  agreement,  obliged  by  their  having  received  the  publick 
money  for  their  fervices,  and  on  whofe  fidelity  the  exiftence  of  the 
nation  more  immediately  depends  ? 

All  civilized  nations  have  united  in  confidering  defertion  from 
publick  fervice,  one  of  the  moil  heinous  offences. 

In  America,  France,  and  Great-Britain,  it  has  been  often  punifh- 
ed  with  death, 

If  it  be  therefore  the  higheft  crime,  and  one  of  the  greateft  inju 
ries  which  a  fubject  can  do  to  his  country  to  defert  its  fervice,  can 
it  be  neceffary  to  prove  that  it  is  unlawful  for  a  friendly  nation  to 
receive,  encourage,  enlift,  and  defend  by  force  fuch  deferters  ? 

In  fupport  of  the  monftrous  opinion,  that  it  is  not  unlawful, 
fome  people  have  remarked,  that  by  the  modern  ufages  of  nations, 
criminals  who  have  committed  offences  lefs  than  murder  and  forgery  t 
are  by  the  courtefy  of  fuch  nations,  not  demanded  when  they  efcape 
out  of  their  own  country  into  a  foreign  one. 

But  let  me  afk,  why  are  murderers  and  forgers  excepted  from 
the  general  rule  ?  Is  it  not  alledged  to  be,  becaufe  juftice  requires 
that  fuch  heinous  criminals  mould  not  efcape  punimment  ?  Becaufe 
the  peace  of  the  nation,  whofe  laws  have  been  violated,  requires 
that  an  example  fhould  be  made  of  fuch  great  offenders  ? 

And  fuppofe  that  it  mould  be  more  important  to  a  nation  to  re 
quire  the  delivery  of  her  military  deferters,  than  of  the  criminals 
abovementioned,  would  (he  not  have  a  right  to  require  them  ? 

On  the  queftions  of  the  Colonial  trade  and  of  the  impreffment 
of  feamen  from  our  merchant  mips,  our  Secretary  of  State  founds 
his  chief  argument  upon  the  filence  of  the  writers  of  the  Laws  of 
Nations  on  thofe  fubje&s.  And  cannot  the  argument  be  retorted 
with  equal  force  on  this  point  ?  Not  a  dictum  can  be  produced  from 
any  writer  to  prove  that  neutral  or  friendly  nations  have  a  right  to 
protect  the  deferters  from  the  fervice  of  belligerents.  And  yet  all 
thefe  writers  difcufs  the  queftion  how  far  nations  can  harbour  the 
criminals  who  efcape  from  other  nations  ;  and  if  any  fuch  right  as 
the  one  for  which'  fome  Americans  contend,  was  conceived  to 
exift,  is  it  poflible  that  fome  one  of  thefe  numerous  writers  would 
not  have  mentioned  it  ? 


21 

In  fa&  the  acknowledged  ufage  of  all  civilized  neutral  nations, 
in  reftoring  fuch  deferters  from  the  armies  or  fhips  of  nations  at 
war,  the  abfolute  neceffity  of  fuch  an  ufage  to  the  exiftence  of 
nations,  perfectly  account  for  this  filence.  A  fa&  which  took 
place  the  laft  year,  in  our  own  country,  proves  that  the  French 
officers  view  it  in  this  light.  Admiral  Willaumez  met  with  an 
American  brig  at  fea  ;  he  found  in  her  four  deferters,  who  had 
efcaped  from  the  Valeureufe  frigate.  Not  content  with  taking 
them  out,  he  writes  a  letter*  in  a  moft  indignant  ftrain,  to  his  Minifter 
at  our  Court,  and  defires  him  to  demand  fatisfaction  for  this  mifcon- 
du&  ; — not  for  the  mifconduft  of  one  of  our  publick  officers,  in 
enlifting  his  men,  and  refufing  to  deliver  them  when  demanded,  but 
for  the  mifconduft  of  a  private  citizen,  in  daring  to  employ  men, 
who  had  been  once  in  the  fervice  of  his  Imperial  Majejty.  This 
cafe,  though  an  extravagant  one,  and  partaking  of  the  character  of 
French  domination,  is  ftrong  evidence  of  the  general  underftanding 
of  military  men,  that  u  deferters  from  publick  fervice  cannot  be 
harboured." 

Such  feems  to  have  been  the  impreffion  of  our  own  Government, 


*  "To  Gen.  TURREAU,  French  Ambaflador  at  Wafhington. 

"  MY   LORD, 

"  You  have  learnt  by  the  arrival  of  fome  of  my  fcattered  fhips  in  America^ 
the  unfortunate  event  by  which  they  were  feparated  from  me."  [Here  Admi 
ral  Willaumez  gives  the  detail  of  the  tempeft.]  That  at  this  date  the  Foud- 
royant  was  nearly  new  mafted,  and  proceeds  to  enforce  to  General  Turrreau, 
how  neceflary  it  was  that  the  {hips  which  had  put  into  the  American  ports  in 
diftrefs,  fhould  haften  to  join  him  at  the  Havana,  where  his  fquadron  if  colledt- 
ed  and  united  to  the  Spanifh.  force  at  that  place,  would  in  effect  oppofe  a 
ftrong  fquadron,  and  double  to  that  of  the  Englifh,  who  at  Jamaica,  have  only 
two  line  of  battle  fhips.  Admiral  Willameuz  further  fays,  that  he  purpofed 
going  to  Vera  Cruz,  agreeably  to  the  project  of  the  government  of  the  Spanifh 
colony  of  Havana,  to  bring  fome  millions  of  dollars,  which  he  ftates  will  be 
more  apropos,  as  the  French  Emperor  had  a  right  to  the  payment  of  one  mill 
ion  of  dollars  of  which  the  fcarcity  was  very  great  at  the  ifland  of  Cuba.  Ad 
miral  Willaumez  then  continues,  "  I  have  juft  apprehended  four  feamen,  defert 
ers  from  the  Valeureufe  frigate,  which  I  found  on  board  an  American  brig, 
where  they  had  engaged  at  feventeen  dollars  per  month.  Now,  fir,  if  you  can 
fucceed  in  making  the  American  government  pay  down  a  compenfation  for 
this  mifcondudl,  in  feducing  thus  our  feamen,  you  will  punifli  it  by  making  it 
fmart  in  that  point  in  which  it  feels  moft,  viz.  its  avarice  in  money,  and  with 
fo  much  the  more  juftice,  thofe  people  (meaning  the  American  merchants)  have 
for  three  years  paft  been  continually  injuring  our  marine  by  feducing  our  beft 
feamen  from  us.  (Signed) 

JLe  C.  Ad.  P.  WILLAUMEZ, 
Onboard  the  Foudroyant,  Havana,  25th  October,  1806." 


22 

and  its  orders  on  this  fubjeft  are  conclulive  as  againft  ourielves.  It 
directed  its  officers  not  to  enlift  deferters  from  the  Britl/h  Jhlps  ; — if 
this  order  had  been  iffued  and  executed  in  good  faith,  we  fhould  have 
been  fully  acquitted,  even  if  deferters  had  been  unintentionally  en 
tered  and  found  on  board,  and  the  whole  weight  of  unprovoked  hof- 
li/ity,  with  which  Great-Britain  has  been  charged,  would  have  reft- 
ed  upon  her  officers. — But  unhappily  for  us,  after  admitting  the 
Law  of  Nations  to  be  as  we  have  ftated,  by  iffuing  the  abovemen- 
tioned  order,  our  fubfequent  conduct  evinces  either  a  want  of  fincer- 
ity  in  iffuing  that  order,  or  a  fubfequent  change  in  the  policy  which 
dictated  it.  If  it  had  been  made  with  good  faith,  why  was  not  a 
regular  formal  enquiry  made  upon  Mr.  Erfkine's  demand  ?  Why 
were  not  the  Britifh  officers  invited  to  point  out  the  men,  and  ex 
hibit  the  evidence  of  their  claim  to  them  ?  Was  not  the  demand  of 
a  publick  Minifter  fufficiently  folemn,  and  did  it  not  require  fome 
notice  and  refpect  ?  Could  it  be  imagined  that  our  officers  could 
know  the  deferters  by  intuition  ?  or  was  it  prefumed  that  they  knew 
them  to  be  on  board,  in  dlrecl  breach  of  the  orders  aforefaid,  not 
to  enlift  them  ? 

Will  it  be  contended,  that  they  were  ignorant  who  they  were, 
and  that  they  relied  upon  the  culprits  coming  forth  of  their  own 
accord,  out  of  a  crew  of  4<00  men,  and  faying  "  Ecce  homines,  we 
deferve  a  halter  ?" 

It  is  apparent  to  every  fair  and  candid  man,  that  if  the  order 
was  iffued  in  good  faith,  when  the  Britifh  officers  gave  notice  that 
five  of  their  feamen  were  enlifted,  there  was  but  one  plain,  upright 
courfe — to  afk  the  Britifh  officers  to  point  out  the  men. 

But  would  you  deliver  up  men  upon  the  mere  declaration  of 
Britifh  officers  ?  !  ! — Do  not  be  alarmed,  I  would  not  ; — but  I 
would  inftitute  an  official  enquiry,  in  which  the  Britifh  officers  as 
profecutors,  ftould  be  permitted  to  exhibit  their  proofs  of  their 
claim  to  the  men  charged  ;  and  the  alledged  deferters  fhould  have 
ample  time,  and  the  aid  of  Government  to  fubftantiate  their  claims 
to  our  protection. 

This  was  the  courfe  of  nature,  of  truth,  of  good  faith,  of  national 
juftice.  It  was  the  way  to  avoid  mifunderflanding,  to  fave  the 
lives  of  our  citizens,  which  have  been  deftroyed  in  confequence  of 


23 


the  neglect  of  this  courfe,  to  avoid  War,  with  which  we  are  threat 
ened. 

There  is  nothing  in  this  procedure  derogatory  to  our  national 
honour.  It  was  referving  the  jurif diction  and  trial  of  the  queftion 
to  ourfehes.  It  would  have  given  perfect  fatisfaction  to  all  par 
ties,  and  would  have  heightened  the  confidence  of  all  nations  in  our 
good  faith. 

It  was  peculiarly  proper  in  this  cafe,  becaufe  the  alledged  defer- 
tion  had  taken  place  in  our  own  territory,  while  the  {hips  of  a 
friendly  power  were  under  our  protection.  We  were  therefore 
bound  to  know,  or  at  leaft  to  enquire  into  the  facts,  and  to  render 
juftice.  A  re/peff  to  our  territorial  rights,  alone  prevented  the  Brit- 
ifh  from  retaking  their  criminals  by  frefli  purfuit.  A  refpect  to 
ourfelves,  and  to  the  obligations  of  an  impartial  neutrality,  required 
that  we  mould  render  them  that  juftice  which  their  refpeft  for  us  pre 
vented  them  from  doing  for  themfelves. 

But  why  was  not  this  natural  and  fair  courfe  of  procedure  adopt 
ed  ?  The  hiftory  of  the  cafe  gives  the  anfwer.  Upon  fuch  an  in- 
veftigation  and  enquiry,  the  deferters  from  the  Halifax  would  have 
all  turned  out  to  be  native  Britim  fubjects  ;  of  courfe  there  could 
have  been  no  apology  for  not  reflating  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
to  reftore  to  thofe  enemies  of  the  human  race,  as  I  have  heard  fome 
perfons  call  them  (hojles  humani  generis)  the  very  means  by  which 
they  were  to  annoy  the  fleet  of  our  illuftrious  friend,  the  Emperor 
of  the  Weft,  and  this  in  the  very  face  of  his  auguft  reprefentathe, 
would  have  been  to  hazard  the  difpleafure  of  our  firmeft,  fafteft 
friend.  In  other  words,  deep  rooted,  and  cultivated  antipathy  to 
Great-Britain,  and  an  habitual  dread,  as  well  as  fincere  partiality  to 
France,  forbad  the  adoption  of  any  meafures,  which,  by  conciliating 
the  former,  would  tend  to  render  the  latter  more  jealous  of  us. 

But  fome  honeft,  and  a  few  able  and  refpectable  men,  who  go 
along  with  us  in  our  opinions  to  this  point,  who  agree,  that  the 
practice  of  enlifting  Britim  deferters  is  extremely  wrong,  and  a  vi 
olation  of  neutrality,  and  even  in  the  opinion,  that  our  own  conduct 
in  this  affair  might  juftify  hoftilities  from  the  government  of  Great- 
Britain,  ftill  contend  that  Berkeley  had  no  fuch  right,  that  it  be 
longed  only  to  his  government  to  wage  war. 


0* 

To  this  opinion  two  anfwers  may  be  given,  both  of  which  arc 
perfectly  fatisfactory  : — 1ft,  That  although  this  doctrine  may  be 
generally  true,  and  it  certainly  very  much  conduces  to  the  peace  of 
nations  to  maintain  it,  yet  it  is  an  affair  altogether  between  the 
fubaltern  officer  and  his  government.  Surely  no  man  will  be  fo  mad 
as  to  contend,  that  Admiral  Berkeley's  having  done  this  act  with 
out  the  authority  of  his  government,  is  a  greater  caufe  of  complaint, 
a  greater  infult,  or  a  more  juftifiable  ground  of  hoftility,  than  if 
the  Britifh  government  had  ordered  it.  If,  therefore,  that  govern 
ment,  after  reviewing  all  the  conduct  of  that  officer,  and  the  cir- 
cumftances  of  provocation,  (hall  approve  the  fteps  he  took,  it  will 
(land  precifely  on  the  fame  footing,  as  if  Mr.  Erfkine  had  reported 
our  refufal  to  deliver  the  deferters  to  his  government,  and  that  gov 
ernment  had  iffued  an  order  to  re-feize  the  men  by  force. 

2dly,  It  is  a  great  miftake  to  fay,  that  a  fubaltern  officer  can  in 
no  cafe  whatever,  of  his  own  authority,  make  reprifals  or  commit 
an  aft  of  hoftility.  It  is  true  that  military  men  are  confidered  in 
a  great  meafure  as  machines,  in  the  hands  of  their  fuperiors  ;  they 
are  bound  to  obey  orders,  and  can  exercife  their  difcretion  fo  far 
only  as  is  necejjary  to  the  execution  of  thofe  orders.  But  if  in  the 
courfe  of  fuch  duty,  an  unexpected  incident  takes  place,  which 
goes  to  defeat  the  object  of  their  orders,  that  fame  military  ftrict- 
nefs  requires  that  they  mould  remove  fuch  obftacle  if  practicable. 
An  officer  is  fent,  as  was  the  commander  of  the  Britifh  fleet  in 
Hampton  roads,  to  watch  and  prevent  the  efcape  of  an  enemy — 
hi  lands  the  guns  of  one  of  his  mips  to  careen  her. — A  neutral  fhip 
of  war,  directly  before  his  eyes,  lands  and  puts  the  guns  on  board, 
and  proceeds  to  fea — will  any  man  be  fo  unreafonable  as  to  contend, 
that  the  Britifh  officer  cannot  purfue  fuch  fhip,  demand  his  guns, 
and  on  refufal,  compel  by  force  the  furrender  of  them  ?  Shall  he 
fubmit  to  fee  the  object  of  his  expedition  defeated,  and  report  to 
his  government  that  he  conceived  it  to  be  more  proper  that  the 
guns  fhould  be  diplomatically  demanded  ? 

But,  fay  fome  other  objettors,  true,  in  extreme  cafes,  the  law  of 
felf-prefervation  will  juftify  an  inferior  officer  in  making  forcible  re 
prifals,  but  was  the  cafe  of  Admiral  Berkeley  fuch  an  one  ?  My  an- 
fwer  is,  that  every  officer  fo  entrufted,  muft  judge  for  himfelf.  He 


25 

takes  his  honour  and  life  in  one  hand,  and  his  fword  in  the  othef. 
If  his  government  juftifies  him,  he  efcapes — if  me  condemns,  befalls. 

But  that  Admiral  Berkeley  had  reafon  to  apprehend  a  total  de- 
ftruction  of  the  Britim  fquadron  on  our  coafls,  the  following  facts 
feem  to  eftablifh  : — 1ft,  It  is  alledged  that  defertion  had  become  fo 
frequent  that  the  Britimfquadron  had  loft  nearly  an  hundred  men, 
between  March  and  June,  and  great  rewards  had  been  offered  at 
Halifax,  by  the  Province,  for  the  apprehenfion  of  thefe  deferters. 
2dly,  Although  Captain  Barren  gave  fuch  wretched  protection  to 
the  deluded  men  who  entered  on  board  his  (hip,  ftill  the  example 
was  fo  contagious,  that  immediately  after  three  men  deferted,  landed 
near  Hampton,  and  were  fecreted  by  our  inhabitants.  Nineteen 
Britifli  feamen  rofe  upon  a  Britim  cutter,  and  brought  her  into  the 
Delaware,  where  they  landed,  were  protected,  and  have  not  been 
delivered  up  ;  on  the  contrary,  our  newfpapers  congratulated  "  thefe 
much  injured  and  high  fpirtted  men,"  on  their  fuccefs. ,*  Six  men  ran 
away  with  a  boat  of  the  Columbine,  at  New- York — and  fix  more 
landed  at  New- York,  from  the  Jafon,  and  are  all  concealed  in  our 
country  : — and  laftly,  fixty-five  failors  rofe  upon  their  officers,  in 
the  Jafon,  with  the  intent  of  efcaping  to  our  friendly  Jh ores — and 
they  would  have  fucceeded,  had  it  not  been  for  the  timely  and 
fpirited  interference  of  their  officers.  This  frigate  has  fmce  arrived 
at  Halifax,  with  fifty  of  her  crew  in  irons,  fo  that  her  cruife  againft 
her  lawful  enemy  was  defeated.  Can  any  one  deny,  after  thefe  ex 
amples,  that  the  cafe  was  fo  extreme  as  to  juftify  an  officer  in  re- 
forting  to  force,  after  every  other  means  had  failed  ? 

But  it  muft  not  be  forgotten  that  the  true,  and  indeed  only 
real  queftion  between  the  two  nations  is,  whether  the  facts  which 
preceded  the  attack  on  the  Chefapeake,  amounted  to  fuch  a  provo 
cation,  that  if  reported  to  the  government  of  Great -Britain,  that 
government  would  have  been  authorized  to  make  reprifals,  or  even 
to  declare  war  againft  us  ? — Let  any  man  confult  the  writers  on 
the  Law  of  Nations,  or  his  own  feelings  of  moral  propriety,  and 
decide.  This  is  certain,  that  as  a  belligerent  nation,  we  mould 
be  the  la/I  to  fubmit  to  a  principle,  which  in  its  operation 
would  completely  defeat  the  beft  concerted  military  enterprifes. 
And  "Me  mould  think  that  our  moderation  had  been  fufficiently 
D 


manifefled,  if,  after  three  feveral  inferior  demands,  our  publick  mm  - 
ifters  had  made  a  formal  demand  of  another  fovereign,  and  been  re- 
fitfed  redrefs. 

But  admit,  if  it  be  pofliblej  that  all  the  reafoning  we  have  cited  is 
wrong,  and  that  we  have  good  caufe  of  war  againft  Great-Britain, 
does  it  follow,  that  war  is  neceffarily  to  be  undertaken  ?  Are  there 
no  cafes  in  which  war,  though  juftifiable,  may  be  avoided,  without 
dishonour  ?  Let  us  Men  to  Grotius  on  that  point : — "  It  is  better 
fometimes  to  remit  our  own.  right,  than  to  engage  in  a  doubtful  war 
for  it,"  "  efpecially  if  undertaken  to  exaft  puni/hment" — which  is 
precifely  the  cafe  in  this  inftance.  We  have  no  principle,  no  inter- 
eft,  no  motive  for  war,  but  to  exaff  puni/hment  in  a  doubtful  cafe. 
Again  fays  Grotius,  "  No  prudent  man  will  adventure  in  fuch  an 
enterprise,  where  good  fuccefs  fliall  bring  little  profit,  but  where 
the  leaft  mifcarriage  may  prove  fatal."  "  Grant  that  our  griev 
ances  are  unjuft,  and  unworthy  to  be  borne,  yet  it  will  not  follow, 
that  we  ought,  by  ftriving  againft  them,  to  make  our  condition 
worfe."  Apply  it  to  our  prefent  cafe. 

If  vizfucceed  in  the  war,  we  gain  the  right  to  cover  a  few  Britifli 
deferters,  whom  we  do  not  want,  and  which,  as  Grotius  fays,  will 
bring  little  profit  ;  but  we  hazard  our  lives,  our  liberties,  our  gov 
ernment — we  do  not  hazard  our  property  ;  that,  together  with 
our  neutral  advantages,  will  inevitably  go  to  enrich  our  enemy.  But 
fome  people  fay,  we  do  not  go  to  war  for  Briti/h  deferters — tliofe 
we  do  not  'want — we  are  better  without  them — we  go  to  war  to 
make  Great-Britain  give  up  the  right  of  fearch  of  omjhips  of  war. 

This  is  one  of  thofe  ERRORS  which  certain  artful  men  have  pur- 
pofely  interwoven  with  the  cafe  of  the  Chefapeake,  with  which  it 
has  no  connexion.  Great-Britain  does  not  claim  this  right — me  will- 
renounce  it  by  treaty — me  at  this  moment  absolutely  difclaims  it.* 
The  cafe  of  the  Chefapeake  was  not  grounded  upon  it  ;  it  was  a 
reprifal  for  a  wrong  done  by  us  ;  for  a  wrong  for  which  remedy 
had  been  refufed  ;  and  it  is,  by  the  Law  of  Nations,  the  only  rem 
edy  fh  or  t  of  war. 

*  It  is  not  improbable  that  Admiral  Berkeley  will  be  recalled  to  afcertaiu 
fatisfaclorily  whether  the  affair  of  the  Chefapeake  is  truly  a  juflifiable  a<St  of 
reprifal,  or  the  affumption  of  a  general  right  to  fearch  publick  fhips,  which 
latter  they  difclaim. 


27 

It  was  no  more  founded  on  the  tight  of  fearch,  than  if  one  of 
our  fhips  on  the  high  feas,  in  time  of  peace,  (hould  forcibly  feize  a 
boat  belonging  to  a  Britifh  fhip,  with  a  lieutenant  and  crew  on 
board,  and  (hould  hold  them  in  durefs  after  demand  ;  and  thereupon 
the  Britifh  captain  mould  attack  and  difable  our  fhip,  and  retake 
his  men  ;  both  thefe  ads  are  equally  reprifals  for  previous  injuries, 
and  are  both  founded  on  the  laws  of  nature  and  nations. 

I  afk,  once  more,  is  war  always  to  be  undertaken,  when  it  is 
juftifiable  ? 

I  anfwer,  our  own  practice  proves  the  contrary.  France  captur 
ed  our  fhips  in  violation  of  the  treaty  of  1778 — me  afterwards  fet 
up  the  abominable  doctrine  of  the  role  d' equipage,  and  condemned 
millions  upon  it — me  afterwards  decreed,  that  all  neutral  veffels, 
having  one  dollar's  value  of  Britifh  manufactures  on  board,  mould, 
together  with  their  cargoes,  be  lawful  prize  ;  and  feveral  more 
millions  fell  under  this  pretext. 

All  thefe  ads  were  violations  of  the  law  of  nations — all  of  them 
were  cdnfe  of  war — yet  we  did  not  go  to  war — we  made  a  treaty, 
and  inftead  of  her  making  either  acknowledgment  or  fatisfaftion  for  ei 
ther  of  thefe  injuries,  we  explicitly  renounced  all  claims  to  them. 

Spain  fhut  the  port  of  New-Orleans,  contrary  to  treaty — me  did 
it  with  marked  infolence — me  has  fince  marched  armed  men  into  our 
territory,  feized  our  citizens,  and  lately  has  taken  poffeffion  of  fome 
of  our  national  military  ftores — ftill  we  have  not  made  war  upon 
Spain,  though  war  would  have  been  juftifiable,  and  though,  both 
with  regard  to  France  and  Spain,  we  had  given  no  caufe  of  offence, 
as  we  have  done  in  this  cafe  to  Great-Britain. 

If  it  be  afked,  how  it  happens  that  the  men  who  were  in  favour 
of  war  with  France  and  Spain,  are  oppofed  to  one  with  Great- 
Britain — I  anfwer,  1ft,  That  the  injuries  of  France  and  Spain  were 
unprovoked,  and  therefore  atrocious  :  2d,  That  thofe  of  Great- 
Britain  have  been  provoked,  even  by  the  acknowledgment  of  our 
government,  who  ordered  its  officers  not  to  enlift  deferters,  which  or 
ders  were  openly  difobeyed — and  therefore  the  caufe  of  war  is  doubtful : 
but  laftly,  Such  was  the  local  and  political  fituation  of  France  and 
Spain,  that  they  could  not  injure  us,  while  they  were  at  war  with 
Great-Britain.  An  impaflable  gulph  lies  between  us — but  we  are 


28 

vulnerable  at  every  pore  by  Great-Britain.  By  her  immenfe  and 
gigantick  naval  force,  fhe  comes  in  contact  with  us  in  every  fea. 
To  deftroy  our  commerce,  would  be  mere  fport  to  her  marine  ;  and 
although  the  Editor  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  and  his  patrons, 
may  think  the  ruin  of  250,000  merchants  a  matter  of  fuch  perfect 
indifference,  that  he  will  not  fuffer  it  to  mar  a  fine  calculation,  yet 
the  people  of  New-England  feel  differently.  They  know  that  they 
are  neceffarily  a  commercial  people  ;  they  have  not  one  million 
Haves  to  labour  for  their  fupport  ;  they  live  by  the  fweat  of  their 
own  Irows  ;  their  fons,  their  kinfmen,  their  friends,  are  engaged  in 
commerce  ;  and  we  farmers  of  the  northern  ftates,  are  not  fo  fool- 
ifh  as  to  believe  that  you  can  deftroy  commerce  without  inflicting  a 
deep  wound  upon  the  interefts  of  agriculture. 

We  are  now  naturally  led  to  confider  the  expediency  of  war,  in 
relation  to  our  means  of  annoyance,  refources,  probable  loffes,  and 
general  effects. 

In  eftimating  thefe  various  branches  of  this  extenfive  queftion  of 
expediency,  I  fhall  not  enter  much  into  the  details,  but  ftiall  ftate 
them  with  all  poffible  brevity,  confiftent  with  perfpicuity. 

Our  means  of  annoyance,  and  refources  as  ftated  by  the  advocates 
of  war,  are  of  two  fpecies,  direct  and  indirect,  military  and  commer 
cial. 

Of  our  military  refources  one  would  think  that  but  little  need  be 
faid.  The  jealoufy  of  military  force  always  fufficiently  ftrong,  has 
been  ftrengthened  by  our  philofophick  adminiftration  ;  the  necefiity 
of  conforming  to  the  falfe  opinions  and  prejudices  by  which  they  ac 
quired  power,  has  obliged  them  to  deftroy  even  the  little  military 
and  naval  force,  which  their  predeceffors  had  built  up.  The  Prefi- 
dent  has  taught  the  people  to  believe,  that  the  experience  of  all 
nations  and  of  all  ages,  was  of  no  avail ;  that  all  his  predeceffors  in 
power,  from  Saul  to  Bonaparte,  have  been  miftaken  in  believing  in 
the  neceffity  of  force  in  order  to  maintain  refpe ft  ;  that  the  fenfe  of 
juftice  is  the  firmeft  hold,  and  reafon  the  moft  effectual  weapon  to 
protect  our  rights,  or  to  avenge  injuries.  With  this  all  conquering 
weapon  he  has  marched  boldly  on,  till  he  has  brought  us  into 
the  field  with  a  foe,  who  having  been  challenged  to  meet  us  there, 
will  take  the  liberty  to  ufe  his  own  weapons. 


29 

If  our  little  band  of  3000  foldiers,  could  be  drawn  off  from  the 
defence  of  a  frontier  of  5000  miles,  and  from  our  tottering  forts, 
more  dangerous  to  their  defenders  than  their  aflailants,  and  if  Mr. 
Jefferfon  could  by  the  force  of  reafon,  perfuade  our  enemies  to 
enter  a  fmall  defile,  like  that  of  Thermopylae,  perhaps  even  this 
little  knot  of  heroes  might  be  immortalized  by  victory.  So  alfo, 
if  our  enemies  would  be  gracioufly  pleafed  to  run  their  line  of  battle 
mips  aground  in  convenient  numbers,  Mr.  Jefferfon's  naval  force 
would  be  found  very  effective,  or,  which  would  be  flill  more  con 
venient,  and  good  humoured  on  the  part  of  our  enemies,  if  they 
would  fend  one  (hip  at  a  time,  to  permit  Mr.  Fulton  to  make  three 
or  four  experiments,  we  could  in  the  courfe  of  two  years,  deflroy 
the  Britifh  navy. 

But  we  have  100,000  militia,  and  we  can  by  the  very  cheap 
procefs  of  an  a&  of  Congrefs,  increafe  this  number  at  pleafure.  If 
the  war  was  to  be  a  defeniive  one,  like  the  laft,  it  muft  be  admit 
ted,  that  this  fpecies  of  force  may  be  calculated  upon.  But  the 
militia  cannot  be  marched  out  of  the  United  States,  and  we  have 
no  ufe  for  them  within. 

But  they  would  volunteer  their  fervices  to  take  Canada  and  No 
va-Scotia. — I  do  not  fay  that  this  achievement  is  impoflible  ;  but  I 
am  furprifed,  that  our  publick  writers  mould  be  fo  little  fparing  of 
our  feelings,  as  to  recal  thofe  two  fcenes  of  our  misfortune. — The 
plains  of  Abraham,  and  the  Ifthmus  of  Penobfcot,  exhibit  no  hon 
ourable  monuments  of  either  our  power  or  conduct. 

But  perhaps  we  might  have  better  fuccefs  in  another  attempt  ; 
perhaps  with  the  lofs  of  twenty  thoufand  men,  and  the  expenfe  of 
fifty  millions  of  dollars,  we  might  take,  and  garrifon  thofe  provinces, 
with  the  exception  of  the  city  of  Quebeck  ;  that  city  we  probably 
could  not  take.*  Suppofe  us  then  in  quiet  poffeffion  of  thefe 

*  It  is  furprifing  with  what  confidence  men  who  are  totally  ignorant  of  the 
ftate  of  thefe  provinces,  boaft  of  taking  them  at  a  (broke.  Quebeck  was  in  a 
ruinous  fituation  when  attacked  before,  and  yet  we  failed  in  our  attempt,  though 
we  had  two  armies  before  it. — It  has  fince,  been  thoroughly  fortified,  and  is 
now  the  Gibraltar  of  America.  We  have  no  reafon  to  doubt,  that  it  would 
hold  out  againft  the  whole  French  army,  at  leafl  as  long  as  Dantzick.  We  on 
the  other  hand,  are  deflitute  of  engineers,  or  military  Ikill  fufficient  for  fuch  an 
operation.  But  we  fhall  be  told,  that  we  fhali  have  French  officers,  French  (kill, 
French  artillery.-" And  is  this  our  confutation  ?  Hie  metus !  heu  libertas  ! 


30 

provinces  ;  of  what  benefit  will  they  be  to  us,  or  what  injury  the 
lofs  of  them  to  our  enemy  ?  To  her  they  have  been  a  conftant 
fource  of  expenfe.  To  us  the  one  would  add  a  inafs  of  population, 
hoftile  to  us  in  feelings,  language,  manners,  religion,  and  attached, 
fmcerely,  and  irrevocably  fo,  to  the  nation  whofe  power  and  afcend- 
ancy  we  have  the  highefl  reafon  to  dread.  Every  Canadian  is  a 
Frenchman  at  heart  ;  flaves  to  their  priefts,  they  can  eafily  be  per- 
fuaded  to  join  the  imperial  banner  of  France,  whenever  the  Empe 
ror  lawfully  authorized  by  the  Sovereign  Pontiff,  mall  think  proper 
to  difplay  it. 

Fifty  thoufand  Canadians,  difciplined  by  French  veteran  officers, 
after  effecting  a  junction  with  50,000  Louifianians,  who  are  equally 
French  in  character  and  feelings,  would  become  very  uncomfortable 
neighbours  to  the  United  States. 

Nova-Scotia  does  not  offer  a  more  tempting  prize. — A  country, 
poor,  miferable,  producing  no  ftaple  article,  populated  by  men,  em 
bittered  againft  us,  by  a  thoufand  recollections,  and  who,  probably, 
in  half  a  century,  will  not  have  forgotten  their  deep  rooted  preju 
dices  againft  us,  and  our  fyflem  of  government.  We  cannot,  more 
over,  retain  Halifax,  without  a  fuperior  naval  force. 

It  will  not  be  pretended  therefore,  that  our  exifting  military 
means,  directed  and  applied  by  our  pacifick  commander  in  chief, 
ought  to  infpire  great  confidence  in  fuccefs. 

But  we  may  be  told,  and  ive  are  gravely  told,  that  we  have  an 
Immenfe  revenue.  Our  overflowing  treafury  appears  to  have  em- 
barraffed  our  government  to  find  means  to  employ  it.  As  reafon 
is  Mr.  Jefferfon's  only  weapon  in  his  exifting  contefts  with  Great- 
Britain  and  Spain,  and  as  that  cofts  no  more  than  Mr.  Madifon's 
falary  and  clerk  hire,  he  never  dreamed  that  it  was  poflible  that  his 
reafon  might  perchance  fail  of  producing  its  effect,  and  that  we 
mould  have  occafion  for  the  ultima  ratio  regum,  powder  and  balls. 

It  is  poffible  that  fome  weak  minds  may  really  believe  that  our 
revenue  is  a  war  refource,  and  that  it  juflifies  our  holding  a  bullying 
language  to  Great-Britain.  For  the  information  of  fuch  men,  we 
mall  ftate  this  point  briefly.  Our  revenue  in  time  of  peace,  is  10 
millions  of  dollars,  of  which  nine  tenths  are  derived  from  impofts 
en  merchandize.  This  revenue,  if  it  could  continue,  is  but  one 


31 

feventeenth  part  of  that  of  our  propofed  enemy,  and  would  be 
wholly  inadequate  to  war  operations.  Four  millions  of  it  are 
pledged  to  pay  the  intereft  of  the  national  debt,  which  if  we  fail  to 
do,  not  a  cent  will  ever  be  obtained  by  loans  or  otherwife.  The 
remaining  fix  millions,  would  defray  the  expences  of  a  war  about 
three  months  annually.  For  the  remaining  nine  months,  each  year, 
we  muft  feek  other  means,  and  incur  a  new  debt.  But  as  it  is  ad 
mitted  by  Mr.  JefFerfon's  paper,  that  our  commerce  will  be  deftroy- 
ed,  our  revenue  founded  folely  on  that  commerce,  will/tf//  'with  it. 

Two  refources  which  our  prefent  rulers  have  rendered  as  unpop 
ular  as  their  talents  would  permit,  muft  then  be  reforted  to — loans 
and  taxes. 

Paft  experience  has  rendered  the  monied  intereft  too  wife,  to  ad 
vance  their  money  without  the  pledge  of  new  taxes  ;  and  even  with 
fuch  a  pledge,  an  adminiftration  which  has  avowed  its  hoftility  to 
publick  faith,  and  the  individuals  of  which  openly  propofed  to  cheat 
the  publick  creditors,  before  they  came  into  power,  can  with  a  very 
ill  grace  propofe  to  borrow,  or  expect  to  be  believed,  when  they 
promife  to  pay. 

But  grant  that  loans  are  obtained,  and  that  the  war  is  carried  on 
with  fpirit  ;  taxes  muft  be  raifed  to  pay  the  intereft  of  thefe  new 
loans.  The  odious  fyftem  of  excife  muft  be  revived,  and  the  ad 
miniftration  muft  be  compelled  to  acknowledge  by  their  conduct, 
the  wife  forefight  of  their  predeceffors.  But  as  an  excife  of  double 
the  former  amount,  would  only  produce  as  much  as  the  former, 
owing  to  the  diminution  of  confumption  produced  by  the  diftrefles 
of  war,  this  fource  of  revenue  will  only  produce  750,000  dollars 
per  annum.  We  muft  then  calculate  upon  about  20,000,000  dol 
lars  direct  taxes  annually,  on  land  and  Jlaves.  In  laying  this  tax, 
Mr.  Jefferfon  will  have  occafion  for  all  his  100,000  militia  and 
volunteers  ;  and  if  we  thought  him  as  much  of  a  ftatefman,  as  his 
friends  pretend  to  do,  we  mould  have  fuppofed  that  this  was  the 
motive  for  raifing  them.  To  bring  this  part  of  the  happy  effects 
of  a  war  for  Britt/h  deferters,  home  to  the  bofoms  of  the  farmers  of 
Maflachufetts,  this  ftate's  proportion  of  the  annual  war  taxes  to  be 
levied  on  lands,  would  be  about  two  millions  of  dollars  per  annum? 
or  about  fixteen  times  the  amount  of  our  prdfent^Kofe  tax,,  and  about 


32 

double  that  of  our  whole  flate  debt  ;  and  if  the  war  fhould  laft  five, 
years,  and  there  is  no  profpeft  of  a  fhorter  iflue,  we  fhould  have 
paid,  if  we  fhould  be  able,  10  millions  of  dollars,  or  a  fum  equal  to 
eighty  years  prefent  taxes. — Nor  is  this  the  worft  fide  of  the  pic- 
lure  ; — as  the  New-England  farmers  are  in  the  habit  of  paying 
what  they  owe,  as  long  as  they  have  any  thing  to  pay  with,  and  as 
the  citizens  of  fame  other  ftates  do  not  pay  till  they  are  compelled,  it 
would  refult,  that  the  chief  burden  of  the  war  would,  as  before,  fall 
upon  us  ; — heavy  balances  of  debts  would  be  accumulated  againfl 
the  fouthern  ftates,  and,  after  the  peace,  we  fhould  have  another 
aft  of  Congrefs  to  wipe  off  thefe  balances,  as  was  urged  with  re 
gard  to  thofe  contracted  during  the  revolutionary  war.* 

Thus  then  we  fee  what  fort  of  reliance  we  can  place  upon  the 
American  army,  navy,  and  revenue,  in  an  offenfive  war  againft 
Great-Britain. 

But  we  are  told,  that  we  can  make  a  predatory  war  upon  the 
Britifh  commerce,  and  our  adminiftration  gives  another  proof  of 
its  fpirit  and  ability,  by  propofing  to  repofe  the  conduct  of  the 
war  in  the  individual  enterprize  of  its  citizens. — This  is  precifely 
in  character  :  but  even  this  reliance,  feeble  and  humiliating  as  it  is, 
will  fail. — They  will  permit  the  people  of  MafTachufetts,  to  be  as 
good  judges  of  this  fubjeft,  as  any  in  the  United  States. 

Inftead  of  fitting  out  their  700  dull  failing  merchantmen  as  pri 
vateers,  their  paft  experience  teaches  them,  that  with  every  advan 
tage  that  fyftem  cannot  be  purfued.f  Great-Britain  towards  the 

*  South-Carolina  is  faid  to  be  juft  collecting  the  tax  laid  in  1798,  and  which 
~ive  paid)  nearly  feven  years  fmce  ;  and  as  fhe  pays,  I  prefume,  no  intereft  for 
this  delay,  it  has  been  at  our  expenfe. — She  has  faved  50,000  dollars  by  this 
plan,  out  of  the  dates  who  paid  with  punctuality. 

f  The  opinions  here  exprefTed  are  perfectly  conformable  to  thofe  of  our 
beloved  Wafhington  in  a  cafe  fimilar  but  lefs  flrong.  Thefe  opinions  may 
be  feen  in  a  letter  addrefTed  from  the  Executive  department  to  Mr.  Mon 
roe,  dated  Sept.  12,  1795 — of  which  the  following  is  an  extract. 

"  How  prepofterous  is  that  policy  which  requires  us  to  abandon  and 
dcftroy  the  very  objetf,  for  the  prefervation  of  which  hoftilities  are  to  be 
commenced  !  It  may  not  be  amifs,"  he  adds,  "  to  enlarge  on  the  confe- 
quences  of  our  engaging  in  the  war  againft  Great-Britain. 

"  1.  Seeing  fhe  lias  the  command  of  the  fea  (and  appearances  iiuEcate  Jlrong- 
ly  that  £he  will  maintain  that  command,)  our  commerce  might  in  one  year 
be  annihilated,  and  thoufands  of  our  feamen  be  fhut  up  or  dying  in  jails 
and  prifon  fliips.  In  addition  to  her  fleets  now  in  commiffion,  privateers 
would  fwarm,  as  foon  as  objects  fo  alluring  and  fo  affailablc  as  American 
commerce  fhould  prefent. 


S3 

clofe  of  the  laft  war,  had  learned  the  fecret  of  paralyzing  this 
fpecies  of  hoftility.  Can  it  then  be  expeded,  that  with  no  enemy 
on  the  ocean,  and  with  double  the  number  of  mips  of  war,  (he  will 
fit  ftill,  and  permit  us  peaceably  to  rob  her  citizens  ?  Every  naval 
officer,  and  every  merchant  knows,  however  ignorant  they  may  be 
at  Wafliington,  that  fifty  faft  failing  frigates  would  as  completely 
blockade  our  ports,  and  fecure  our  privateers  from  the  power  of 
doing  injury,  as  if  they  were  under  lock  and  key,  or  hauled  up  a  la 
Jefferfon,  in  the  dry  docks  of  the  Potomac. 

We  proceed  then  to  confider  the  other  branch  of  our  means  of 
annoyance,  which  may  be  called  commercial  warfare. — It  is  main 
tained,  that  we  can  by  a  war  bring  Great-Britain  to  an  acknowl 
edgment  of  our  claims  ;  by  confiscating  the  debts  due  to  her 
merchants  ;  by  ruining  her  manufacturers  ;  by  refufing  to  be 
cloathed  ;  and  by  ftarving  her  Weft-India  colonies.  Although  it 
would  be  eafy  to  (hew,  that  all  thefe  meafures  would  eventually 
produce  more  diftrefs  to  the  United  States  than  to  Great-Britain, 
that  in  all  cafes  of  this  nature,  the  dependance  is  mutual,  and  that 
in  fuch  contefts,  the  porjrejl  ftate  always  fuffers  the  moft  ;  yet  I 
mall  leave  this  point  to  the  good  fenfe  of  my  readers,  and  confider 
them  as  operating  only  on  Great-Britain. 

Firft  then,  we  are  to  carry  on  the  war,  and  to  diftrefs  our  enemy 

"  If  we  look  back  to  the  two  laft  years  of  our  revolutionary  war,  a 
judgment  may  be  formed  on  this  point.  A  {hiking  defecSt  in  her  naval 
arrangements  in  preceding  years,  left  our  ports  open  for  the  entry  of  com 
merce,  for  the  equipment  of  privateers,  and  the  introduction  of  prizes.  A 
different  arrangement  in  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  totally  changed  the 
fcene.  The  fmall  privateers  were  hauled  up  as  unable  to  cope  with  arm 
ed  merchantmen,  and  the  larger  privateers  were  taken.  Our  fhipping  fell 
at  the  fame  time  a  facrifice  to  the  vigilant  operations  of  the  Britifh  navy. 

"  At  the  prefent  moment  (1795)  her  naval  power  is  extended  beyond  all 
former  examples  ;  while  that  of  her  enemies  is  at  leaft  not  increafed. 

"  2dly.  Our  landed  as  well  as  commercial  interefts  would  fuffer  beyond  all 
calculation.  Agriculture  above  the  fupply  of  our  own  wants,  would  be  fuf- 
pended,  or  its  produce  perish  on  our  hands.  The  value  of  our  lands  and  ev 
ery  fpecies  of  domeftick  property  would  fink. 

"  Sdly.  The  fources  of  revenue  failing,  publick  credit  would  be  deftroyed, 
and  multitudes  of  citizens  involved  in  ruin.  The  people  at  large  would  be 
plunged  from  the  fummit  of  profperity  into  an  abyfs  of  ruin,  too  fudden 
and  too  fevere  to  be  patiently  borne.  To  increafe  their  calamities,  direct 
taxes  must  be  levied  to  fupport  the  war  ;  and  it  would  be  happy  for  us 
if  we  could  comtemplate  only  foreign  war,  in  which  all  might  unite" 


34 

by  reforting  to  the  old  difgraceful  fyftem  of  confiscation.  If  the 
profligacy  and  infamy  of  fuch  proportions  have  no  weight  in  the 
eftimation  of  our  fellow  citizens,  (which  I  will  not  believe)  they 
will  furely  liften  to  the  maxims  of  experience,  a  dear  bought  expe 
rience,  and  an  enlightened  policy.  How  trifling  a  fum  it  produced 
to  the  nation  in  the  laft  war,  every  publick  man  knows. — Its  only 
tendency  was  to  fcreen  a  few  fraudulent  debtors,  who  rejoicing  in 
an  opportunity  to  defraud  their  honeft  creditors^  could  of  courfe, 
think  it  no  robbery  to  defraud  the  publick.  Nothing  came  into 
the  publick  cheft,  and  even  the  joy  of  the  fraudulent  debtor  was 
extremely  fiort  lived.  At  the  treaty  of  peace,  Great-Britain,  as 
muft  always  be  the  cafe,  infilled  as  a  fine  qua  non,  upon  the  reftor- 
ation  of  the  rights  of  her  bona  fide  fubjefts. — The  courts  were 
opened  to  the  Britifh  creditors,  and  the  debtors  were  compelled  to 
pay  with  accumulated  intereft  : — nor  was  this  the  ivorjl  part  of  it  ; 
the  Virginia  legiflature  refufed  to  obey  the  publick  authority  ;  it 
neglected  to  open  its  courts  ;  their  citizens  who  owed  the  Britifh 
merchants,  availed  themfelves  of  this  fufpenfion  of  right,  of  this 
Jlate  rebellion  againft  the  treaty,  and  became  bankrupt.  Great- 
Britain  infiiled  on  redrefs,  for  this  violation  of  the  treaty,  and  Mr. 
Jefferfon  ratified  a  convention  on  this  fubjeft,  and  has  paid  to 
Great-Britain  three  millions  of  dollars,  on  account  of  thefe  fufpend- 
ed  debts. 

Is  our  paft  experience  then  favourable  to  a  repetition  of  this 
fyftem  of  iniquity  ?  But  nations  ought  to  be  governed  by  more 
extenfive  policy  ; — meafures  ought  never  to  be  reforted  to,  the 
tendency  of  which,  is  to  debafe  the  morals  of  the  people,  and  to 
fink  the  national  character. 

If  we  go  to  war  with  Great-Britain,  it  will  not  be  eternal  ; — 
peace  muft  fooner  or  later  arrive  :  our  interefts,  the  great  and  ef- 
fential  interefts  of  our  country,  require  that  Europe  mould  be  our 
work  mop  : — fo  fays  Mr.  Jefferfon  ;  fo  all  fenfible  men  admit. — 
Great-Britain  is  the  cheapeft  labourer  ;  her  manufactures  are  fuited 
to  our  habits,  and  our  neceflities.  But  neither  Great-Britain,  nor 
any  other  nation  with  whom  we  may  by  pofiibility  be  embroiled,  will 
ever  truft  us,  if  we  pafs  confifcation  laws,  without  adding  to  the  price 
of  the  goods  a  premium  for  the  rifle  of  a  fraudulent  confifcation  ; 


35 

and  as  all  fuch  rifles  are  over  eftimated,  we  mall  probably  pay  ten 
times  over,  for  the  paltry  and  wicked  fatisfa6lion  of  robbing  her 
private  citizens,  who  have  trufted  their  property  to  curs. 

Such  were  the  enlightened  views  of  Mr.  Jay  and  Preiident 
Wafhington,  and  few  men  had  better  opportunities  of  judging  of 
the  effects  of  confifcation.  Mr.  Jay  was  directed,  and  did  accord 
ingly  agree  to  an  article,  which  is  a  permanent  one,  and  (till  in 
force,  ftipulating,  "  that  in  all  future  wars  between  us  and  Great- 
Britain,  no  confifcation  of  private  debts  mould  be  made." — Can 
it  then  be  contended,  that  in  the  only  cafe  in  which  the  article  was 
to  operate,  it  becomes  void  ?  And  will  it  be  pretended  that  nations 
can  make  no  regulations  to  foften  the  rigors,  and  leflen  the  calam 
ities  of  war  ? 

Without  fuch  an  article,  Great-Britain  never  would  make  peace 
with  any  nation  whom  (he  fupplies,  without  ftipulating  for  the 
payment  of  debts  due  to  her  citizens,  and  with  fuch  an  article  in  her 
hand,  what  could  any  honeft  American  commiflioners  for  making 
peace,  fay  to  her  negotiators  ?  The  man  muft  be  hardened  indeed, 
who  will  contend,  that  we  ought  to  exercife  a  power,  malum  in  fe, 
debafing,  corrupting,  difgraceful,  and  in  face  of  a  pofitive,  humane, 
and  honourable  ftipulation. 

But  fecondly,  we  are  to  ruin  the  manufacturers  of  Great-Britain, 
at  the  very  profpect  of  a  war  they  were  to  rife  in  rebellion  ;  the 
prophecy  on  this  fubject,  has  turned  out  already  to  be  partially  falfe. 

Inftead  of  that  terror,  that  violent  oppofition  to  war  from  the 
manufacturers,  we  hear  of  no  difturbance,  and  very  little  uneafmefs. 
The  great  manufacturing  towns  in  England,  have  taken  no  fteps  to 
prevent  a  war  or  to  exprefs  their  anxiety  about  it  ;  on  the  con 
trary,  we  learn  from  perfons  who  have  arrived  from  England,  that 
a  war  with  us  is  at  leajl  not  unpopular,  and  efpecially  in  Birming- 
ham,  which  is  the  greateft  work  Jhop  for  this  country.  I  might 
reft  the  argument  here,  for  it  will  be  admitted,  that  no  people  are 
better  judges  of  their  intereft,  than  the  manufacturers  of  England  j 
and  if  a  war  would  be  fo  ruinous  to  them,  they  certainly  would 
not  be  quiet  as  we  know  they  were,  though  a  war  was  expected. 

But  I  will  give  a  very  brief  fummary,  to  (hew  that  a  war  would 
not  be  very  injurious  to  thefe  manufacturers. 


36 

lit.  Their  articles  are  many  of  them  of  the  frjl  necefiity,  and 
nations  at  war  with  them,  muft  and  will  get  them,  in  fpite  of  pro 
hibitory  regulations.  Bonaparte  has  exerted  all  his  power  for  live 
years,  to  mut  out  their  manufactures,  and  yet  his  own  army,  and 
even  court,  are  openly  clothed  in  them.  If  700,000  troops  can 
not  mut  them  out  of  France,  will  patriotifm  without  a  fword,  ef 
fect  it  in  America  ?  Patriotifm  did  not  prevent  hundreds  of  our 
countrymen  from  fitting  out  privateers  and  taking  our  own  veflels  ; 
many  have  grown  rich  by  plunder  of  this  fort.  Patriotifm  does 
not  prevent  the  flave  trade,  though  the  laws  are  fo  feverely  pro 
hibitory.  In  fhort,  patriotifm  cannot  be  calculated  upon,  to  effect 
that  which  power  finds  it  vain  to  attempt. 

2dly.  A  much  fmaller  proportion  of  the  population  of  the  unit 
ed  kingdoms  of  Great-Britain  and  Ireland,  are  employed  in  manu 
facturing  for  us,  than  we  have  ufually  thought. — Not  more  than 
one  fixth  part  of  the  population  of  Great -Britain,  is  employed  in 
any  manufaflures.  Four  fifths  at  leaft  of  the  manufactures  of  all 
nations,  are  confumed  at  home.  Great-Britain  exports  only  about 
fix  millions  worth  annually,  to  America,  and  it  is  only  the  profits 
on  this  capital,  which  me  would  lofe,  which  would  not  exceed  one 
million. — She  might  not  even  lofe  that  ;•— the  capital  which  is  now 
employed  in  manufacturing  for  us,  may  be  withdrawn  from  manu 
factures,  and  employed  in  agriculture  and  commerce,  and  it  would 
only  be  the  difference  of  profit  between  the  new  employ,  and  the 
old,  which  flie  would  lofe.  But  grant  that  me  mould  lofe  one  mil 
lion  per  annum — will  that  materially  affect  the  policy  of  a  nation 
whofe  revenue  is  40  millions  ?  Is  Great-Britain  to  be  ruined  by  an 
additional  million  ?  If  that  be  the  cafe,  to  borrow  a  phrafe  from  a 
writer  of  our  own,  "  We  have  only  to  gather  up  our  garments  and 
fall,  with  decency."  If  Great-Britain  be  fo  reduced  as  to  be  ruin 
ed  by  one  million  more,  Jbe  muft  fall,  and  how  long  our  rights  and 
liberties,  and  the  liberty  of  the  feas  will  furvive  her,  I  mail  endeav 
our  to  mew  briefly  in  the  conclufion  of  this  {ketch. 

But  laftly,  we  are  to  ftarve  her  Weft-India  colonies. — It  is  reaU 
ly  aftonifhing,  that  men  will  be  fo  blinded  by  their  hatred  to  Great* 
Britain,  as  to  urge  and  appear  to  believe  fuch  abfurd  notions. 
Why  did  they  not  ftarve  during  the  revolutionary  war  ?  Nova- 


37 

Scotia  then  fupplied  them  with  little  or  nothing  ;  fhe  can  now 
fupply  them  with  nearly  all  they  want.  They  do  not  take  our 
beef  and  pork  in  peace,  they  are  fo  dainty  ;  and  yet  we  talk  of 
ilarving  them  !  But  if  they  could  fupport  a  war  of  eight  years, 
when  Nova-Scotia  was  a  young,  uncultivated  country,  when  our 
privateers  fwarmed  in  thefe  feas,  and  the  ocean  was  covered  with 
the  fleets  of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  how  much  eafier  will  it 
be  to  fuftain  a  war,  when  the  provifion  veflels  of  England,  can 
navigate  in  perfect  fafety,  having  no  o:  e  to  make  them  afraid  ? 
But  do  we  not  view  the  other  fide  of  the  picture  ?  Poffeffed  as 
they  will  be  of  Buenos  Ayres,  where  provifions  are  cheaper  than 
in  any  part  of  the  world,  is  there  not  danger,  that  a  war  with  uc 
may  turn  their  attention  to  other  channels  of  fupply,  and  thus 
deftroy,  perhaps  for  ever  this  branch  of  our  commerce  ? 

It  will  be  feen  then,  that  the  hope  of  coercing  Great-Britain  by 
commercial  warfare,  is  as  delufive  and  defperate,  as  by  arms  ; — and 
after  a  long,  but  bloodlefs  war,  in  which  we  mould  be  called  upon 
to  fuffer  rather  than  act,  we  mould  probably  be  obliged  to  aban 
don  the  claims  for  which  the  war  was  undertaken,  unlefs  Great- 
Britain,  from  caufes  totally  out  of  our  control,  mould  be  obliged  to 
yield  to  the  refiftlefs  power  of  France. 

Let  us  now  take  a  brief  view  of  the  effects  of  a  Britifh  war,  up 
on  ourfelves. — Thofe,  who  deluded  by  the  language  of  the  war 
newfpapers,  and  efpecially  Mr.  Jefferfon's,  believe,  that  we  are  to 
enter  into  a  war  in  which  Great-Britain  will  be  the  only  fufferer ; 
and  that  we  mail  continue  to  profper  as  before,  will  be  woefully 
deceived.  Not  a  man  who  has  any  thing  to  lofe,  not  a  labourer, 
who  depends  on  the  fweat  of  his  brow,  but  will  feel,  and  rue  the 
effects  of  fuch  a  war  : — they  will  be  almofl  equally  felt,  and  per 
ceived  in  the  compting-houfes  of  the  merchants  ;  the  parlours  of 
the  rich  ;  and  the  cottage  of  the  poor. 

The  farmer  will  furrender  his  cattle  to  the  tax  gatherer  ;  the 
mechanick  will  be  obliged  to  hang  up  his  rufty  tools  ;  and  the 
children  of  our  induftrious  fifhermen,  will  demand  their  bread  in 
vain.  This  is  not  the  picture  of  a  fourth  of  July  orator — it  is 
fober  reality.  The  National  Intelligencer  with  the  fang  froid  of 
a  true  philosopher,  configns  to  beggary  250,000  merchants.  He 


38 

admits  "  that  commerce  will  be  deftroyed  by  a  war,  and  in  its 
fall  will  crufh  its  immediate  dependents  ;"  but  he  infults  the  un- 
derftandings  of  us  New-England  farmers,  by  infmuating  that  all  tl.e 
other  claffes  of  fociety  will  efcape  its  effedls.  Who  are  to  employ 
and  give  bread  to  the  300,000  mechanicks  in  our  feaport  towns, 
after  the  merchants  are  beggared  ?  Who  are  to  pay  the  banks 
when  all  the  property  of  their  debtors  is  annihilated  by  war  ? 
When  the  banks  flop  their  dividends,  and  lofe  part  of  their  capitals, 
what  will  become  of  the  widows  and  orphans  who  have  depofited 
their  little  modicum  in  thefe  publick  inftitutions  ?  When  the  fmall 
country  banks  fail,  who  will  indemnify  the  farmers  who  hold  their 
bills?  \ 

What, will  become  of  the  country  traders,  and  the  farmers,  who 
owe  them,  when  the  creditors  of  the  beggared  merchants  call  upon 
them  for  immediate  payment  ? 

It  is  admitted,  by  the  advocates  of  war,  that  commerce  will  be 
wholly  annihilated  ;  with  that  falls  our  revenue  : — the  collection 
of  direct  taxes  will  be  found  fo  flow,  and  fo  unpopular,  and  the 
calls  on  government  will  be  fo  much  more  preffing  than  thofe  of  the 
publick  creditors,  that  the  intereft  of  the  national  debt  will  be  fuf- 
pended.  The  party  in  power,  have  always  been  oppofed  to  this 
clafs  of  publick  creditors,  and  though  they  have  as  yet  paid  punttu- 
ally,  and  have  not  violated  the  contract,  it  is  only  becaufe  they 
have  had  ample  means,  and  it  was  a  convenient  engine  of  power  ; — 
it  was  a  ftrong  hold  over  their  political  enemies. — But  create  more 
preffing  exigencies,  and  thoufands  of  honeft  creditors  will  be  left 
to  ftarve. — This  is  what  they  formerly  propofed — it  would  gratify 
manyfecret  wiflies. 

If  a  war,  then,  will  annihilate  commerce,  as  the  National  Intelli 
gencer  admits,  will  ruin  250,000  merchants,  beggar  all  the  me 
chanicks  immediately  dependant  on  the  merchants,  injure  fome,  and 
produce  the  failure  of  many  of  the  banking  inftitutions — if  it  will 
deflroy  our  revenue,  and  oblige  the  government  to  fufpend  the  pay 
ment  of  the  intereft  of  the  national  debt — if,  moreover,  as  a  necef- 
fary  confequence,  it  will  cripple,  if  not  bankrupt  our  infurance 
companies,  can  the  farmers  hope  to  efcape  the  general  devaftation  ? 

Are  there  none  alive  who  recoiled  the  effeds  of  our  revolution. 


ary  war  ?  Can  agriculture  flourim,  when  there  are  no  buyers  ' 
When  all  the  other  orders  of  fociety  are  ruined,  the  taxes  muft  fall 
upon  the  land-holders — and  we  have  fhewn,  that  the  revenue  from 
impoft  failing,  the  farmers  will  be  called  upon  to  defray  the  whole 
expenfes  of  the  war,  which  will  annually  amount  to  about  fixteen 
times  the  fum  of  our  prefent  State  tax. 

Can  any  agricultural  profits  meet  thefe  exigencies  ?  When  our 
children  are  called  off  from  the  labours  of  the  plough,  to  thofe  of 
war,  can  we  fupport  our  families,  and  pay  the  extraordinary  demands 
of  government  ?  Let  thofe  who  view  thefe  as  light  and  tolerable 
evils,  be  clamorous  for  war  j  but  for  my  part,  I  prefer  to  renounce 
the  right  of  protecting  and  enlifting  the  fubjects  of  foreign  nations, 
when  our  own  population  furnimes  men  fufficient  for  our  commerce 
and  our  navy,  to  embarking  in  a  doubtful  conteft,  ruinous  in  its  ef 
fects,  and  uncertain  as  to  its  iffue. 

I  have  faid  that  the  war,  which  we  are  called  upon  to  wage, 
would  be  a  war  without  hope.  I  have  endeavoured  to  mew  that  we 
can  place  no  reafonable  reliance  on  our  oiv n  refources  in  an  offeniive 
and  extraneous  war  againft  Great-Britain  :  but  I  mall  be  told,  that 
we  may  calculate  upon  the  aid  of  France,  Spain,  Holland,  and 
Ruflia.  Indeed,  we  have  been  already  told,  that  fuch  an  alliance 
would  fecure  us  fuccefs.*  Without  entering  into  the  impolicy  of 
thus  embarking  in  the  wide  field  of  European  politicks,  let  us  ad 
mit  that  we  do  fo  embark,  and  that  the  utmoft  fuccefs  crowns  our 
efforts — let  us  fuppofe  our  enemy,  Great-Britain,  proftrate  at  the 
feet  of  the  allied  powers — would  our  fituation  be  ameliorated  ? 
Should  we  be  confidered  as  principals,  or,  like  the  other  allies,  as 
humble  vaffals  in  the  train  of  the  victor  ?  Rome  too  had  her  allies, 
but  was  their  fituation  lefs  dependant  than  thofe  of  the  vanquimed  ? 


*  We  already  perceive,  by  the  fubjoined  account  of  the  celebration  of  the 
late  French  victories  in  Georgia,  that  fome  of  our  citizens  have  already  con- 
needed  our  deftinies  with  thofe  of  France.  This  article  is  copied  from  the 
Palladium,  of  Oa.  2.— «  Savannah,  Sept.  12.  On  Saturday,  the  12th  inftant,  a 
numerous  company  of  republicans  aflembled  at  the  Filature,  to  celebrate  the 
victories  of  the  French  nation  over  the  allies  of  England— events  leading  to  the 
peace  and  profperity  of  thefe  U.  States— the  Hon.  Edward  Telfain  Prefident, 
William  Stephens,  and  Peter  H.  Morel,  Elq'rs.  Vice-Prefidents." — Are  we  neu 
tral  ?  Are  Ruffia  and  Pruffia  our  friends  ?  Is  it  ufual  to  rejoice  over  the  de- 
ftruction  of  one's  friends  ? 


40 


Grant  all  that  is  affumed,  that  Britain  is  the  tyrant  of  the 
will  the  man  who  fubjugated  the  brave  and  inoffending  Swifs,  who 
annihilated  the  republick  of  Italy,  to  place  a  diadem  on  his  own 
brow,  who  compelled  the  ftubborn  Dutchman,  our  friend  and  ally,* 
to  receive  a  mafter,  after  100  years  of  unexampled  refiftance 
to  oppreffion  —  who  has  left  not  one  mred  of  liberty  or  independ 
ence,  through  the  vaft,  populous,  and  powerful  regions,  over  which 
his  victorious  arms  have  extended,  be  delicately  or  fcrupuloufly  re 
gardful  of  the  maritime  rights  of  nations  ? 

Having  conquered  the  continent  of  Europe,  he  exclaimed,  "  all 
I  want  are  commerce,  colonies  andjhips."  Can  any  virtuous  and  high- 
minded  freeman  of  our  country  believe,  that  in  procuring  the  grat 
ification  of  thefe  wants,  he  will  be  more  fcrupulous  or  tender  of  the 
nghts  of  other  nations,  than  he  has  been  in  attaining  the  vaft  and 
immeafurable  power  which  he  now  poffeffes  ? 

It  may  perhaps  be  thought  by  Jbme,  that  I  have  been  too  free  in 
my  cenfures  of  the  prefent  adminiftration,  that  I  have  intimated 
that  they  have  rather  courted,  than  fought  to  avoid,  the  prefent 
itate  of  mifunderilanding  between  us  and  Great-Britain.  I  con- 
fefs  that  if  fuch  mould  be  the  inference,  it  would  not  be  an  unfair 
one.  I  have  always  been  apprehenfive,  that  the  marked  partiality 
or  dread  of  France,  and  the  deep-rooted  hoftility  to  Great-Britain, 
which  they  have  invariably  difcovered,  would  lead  to  unpleafant 
confequences.  It  is  well  known,  to  all  men  who  have  noticed  the 
courfe  of  our  political  hiftory,  that  the  perfons  now  adminiftering 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  have  avowed,  both  before 
and  fince  they  came  into  power,  a  fettled  oppofition  to  Great- 
Britain. 


*  Holland  has  been  one  of  our  fafteft,  firmeft  friends — fhe  took  an  early  and 
an  honeft  part  in  favour  of  our  liberties.  Her  aid  was  not,  as  the  French  direc 
tory  fay  theirs  was,  the  "  fruit  of  a  bafe  fpeculation."  The  Dutch  love  freedom 
— fevenly  years  war  for  the  attainment  of  it,  had  endeared  it  to  them.  Who 
Avould  have  imagined  that  our  prefent  adminiftration  would  have  been  the  firft 
to  infult  a  nation,  to  whom  we  were  bound  by  fo  many  ties  of  gratitude,  by 
congratulating  their  upfhrt  tyrant  on  his  acceffion  to  the  throne  ?  Who  would 
have  thought  that  our  republican  Prefident  would  have  been  fo  eager  to  ad- 
drefs  his  "  dearly  beloved  brother  of  Holland  ?"  What  would  have  been 
faid  of  Wafhington,  if  he  bad  thus  put  the  feal  to  tyranny,  efpecially  when 
having  no  minifter  at  that  Court,  there  could  be  no  neceffity  of  faying  any  thing 
on  the  fubje<fl  ?  Sod  tempora  mutantur  et  nos  mutamur  cum  illis ! 


41 

It  is  of  no  moment  to  confider  the  private  motives  which  have 
led  to  this  undue  prejudice.*-  It  is  fufficient  to  fay  that  the  fa& 
exifts,  and  is  avowed  and  juftified  in  Mr.  Jefferfon's  paper,  the  Na 
tional  Intelligencer. 

They  even  declare  that  we  ought  to  go  back  to  the  events  of  the 
revolutionary  war,  to  fharpen  our  refentments  againft  Great-Britain. 

Whether  thefe  prejudices  had  any  (hare  in  induciug  the  Prefident 
to  fend  back  the  treaty,  made  by  his  own  minifters  extraordinary, 
I  mail  not  undertake  to  decide  ;  but  I  take  the  liberty  to  make 
on  this  topick  three  remarks. 

1ft,  That  it  is  a  thing  unexampled  in  the  hiftory  of  nations,  to 
fend  back  a  treaty  made  by  authorized  agents,  unlefs  they  were  ei 
ther  corrupt,  exceeded  their  authority,  or  compromifed  the  moft  ef- 
fential  interefts  of  the  State,  in  either  of  which  cafes  the  minifters 
ought  to  be  recalled. 

2d,  That  it  is  unreafonable  to  expe&  in  a  publick  treaty  with 
another  nation,  that  every  article  mould  be  in  our  own  favour — 
fomething  muft  neceffarily  be  given  up  on  both  fides,  or  a  ftate  of 
hoftility  never  could  ceafe.  The  only  queftion  ought  to  be,  wheth 
er  it  was  as  good,  as  under  all  the  circumftances  of  the  cafe,  we 
had  a  right  to  cxpeA  ?  It  is  believed  that  this  treaty,  on  the  whole, 
was  fuch  an  one  as  the  United  States  ought  to  have  accepted. 

3d,  That  there  was  no  foundation  for  the  report,  that  there  was 
annexed  to  the  treaty  a  condition  which  the  United  States  ought 
not  to  have  acceded  to. 

It  may  perhaps  occur  to  fome  of  our  readers,  convinced  as  they 
will  be  of  the  impolicy  of  entering  into  a  war  with  Great-Britain, 
and  of  the  total  incompetency  of  our  means  to  cany  on  fuch  a 
war,  to  a(k,  Is  it  good  policy  to  expofe  the  weaknefs  of  our  coun 
try  to  the  world  ?  Does  it  not  betray  a  want  of  patriotifm,  to  pub- 
li(h  our  opinion  of  our  own  mifcondu6l,  and  to  endeavour  to  prove 
that  we  are  unable  to  cope  with  a  nation  with  whom  we  may  poffi- 
bly  be  embroiled  ?  This  is  a  fpecies  of  popular  error,  too  common 
with  many  defcriptions  of  perfons  in  our  country. 

With  my  juftification  on  this  topick,  I  mall  clofe  this  addrefs  to 
my  fellow-citizens. 
F 


In  all  free  governments,  publick  opinion  mult  eventually  direct        j 
the  molt  important  meafures  of  the  adminiftration.     When  once  ex-      ifl 
prefled  by  the  legal  *conftituted  authorities •,  it  is  binding  upon  all  the 
citizens,  though  it  isjli/l  competent  for  them  to  ufe  the  prefs,  in 


*  We  fay,  that  when  exprefled  by  the  conjlituted authorities,  this  publick  opin 
ion  ought  to  be  treated  with  the  Ugheft  refpeft  ;  and  one  would  have  fuppofed, 
that  in  a  country  like  ours,  which  boafls  of  its  light  and  information,  a  con 
trary  opinion  could  not  prevail :  but  the  National  Intelligencer,  in  its  ferious 
reafoning,  conliders  the  expreflion  of  the  publick  opinion,  by  the  populace  in 
about  twelve  mercantile  towns  as  binding  on  all  the  citizens.  In  reply  to  fome 
reafonings,  endeavouring  to  fliew  that  war  would  not  be  justifiable,  that  paper 
remarks,  that  it  is  unneceffary  to  enter  into  the  difcuflion  of  the  juftice  of  a  war, 
"  the  people  have  decided  that  queftion — they  have  -willed  it,  unlefs  ample  rep 
aration  be  made." 

The  Chronicle  holds  the  fame  language. 

Now  we  undertake  to  fay,  that  the  numbers  and  the  violence  difplayed  on 
this  occafion,  were  lefs  than  thofe  which  appeared  in  oppofition  to  the  Britifh 
Treaty — every  one  of  the  fame  great  cities  was  in  oppofition  to  that  inftru- 
ment — but,  happily  for  our  country,  Wafhington  did  not  miftake  the  clamours 
of  a  multitude  in  a  great  city,  which  peaceable  men  think  it  more  prudent  to  go 
with  than  to  oppofe,  in  the  firft  paroxyfms  of  its  rage,  for  the  •will  of  the  people. 

Governor  Sullivan  and  Sheriff  Allen  tried  at  that  time  the  effect  of  oppofi 
tion,  and  they  had  very  convincing  proofs  of  the  wifdom,  good  fenfe,  and  rea- 
fonablenefs  of  an  infuriated  populace. 

It  is  ridiculous  to  call  the  proceedings  at  the  State-Houfe,  in  Boflon,  the 
fenfe  of  the  inhabitants  of  Maffachufetts.  Thofe  of  us  who  were  near  enough 
to  Boflon  to  lift  up  the  fplendid  veil  with  which  thefe  things  are  covered, 
know,  that  neither  that  meeting,  nor  the  one  figned  by  William  Cooper,  were 
correct  expreffions  of  the  publick  will. 

The  hiftory  of  thefe  meetings  is  briefly  this  : — The  cool  and  judicious  men  of 
both  parties  in  Boflon,  were  oppofed  to  having  any  meeting  on  the  fubject, 
and  openly  exprefled  their  difapprobation  of  them.  Not  that  the  inhabitants 
of  this  metropolis  are  ever  behind  their  fellow-citizens  in  their  zeal  to  vindicate 
the  rights,  and  maintain  the  honour  of  their  country — but  they  thought  that 
we  were  too  ignorant  of  the  facts,  and  too  uncertain  of  the  true  courfe  to  be 
purfued,  to  venture  to  give  a  decided  opinion  upon  the  fubject.  Such  was 
the  temper  of  the  inhabitants,  when  a  refpect  for  the  citizens  of  Norfolk,  in 
duced  the  Selectmen  to  call  a  town-meeting.  At  this  meeting,  it  is  well  known 
that  fo  great  an  uncertainty  prevailed,  as  to  the  true  policy  to  be  adopted,  that 
the  inhabitants,  on  the  propofi tion  to  appoint  a  committee,  did  not  generally 
vote  on  either  fide,  and  the  refpectable  Moderator,  thinking  that  the  luke- 
warmnefs  difcovered  was  not  fufficiently  refpectful  for  the  occafion,  intimated 
the  propriety  of  more  apparent  zeal,  and  actually  put  the  queftion  a  fecond  time. 

This  ftate  of  facts  is  well  known,  and  the  Editor  of  the  Aurora,  at  Philadel 
phia,  has  an  arch  allufion  to  it,  when  he  obferved,  that  the  refolutions  of  Bof- 
ton  were  force-meat.  The  Chronicle  repeated  this  wit  againft  its  own  town, 
and  yet  has  the  effrontery  to  cite  thefe  refolutions,  as  expreffive  of  the  publick 
will.  It  may  be  faid,  that  this  goes  to  prove  that  many  individuals  acted  with 
infincerity. 

I  afk,  how  people  muft  be  expected  to  act  in  a  popular  government,  when 
the  paffions  are  fuddenly  and  violently  inflamed  ?  To  foothe  and  perfuadc 
or  oppofe  and  inflame  ? 


43 

order  to  effed  a  change  in  the  adminiftration,  or  a  repeal  of  the 
meafures. 

But  as  this  publick  opinion  may  be  direded  or  foreftalled  by 
artful  and  defigning  men,  or  may  be  mifdireded  by  error  or  paflion, 
it  is  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  thofe  who  believe  that  fuch 
errors  exift,  to  endeavour  to  corred  them. 

When,  therefore,  a  party  of  men,  from  finifter  or  from  honejl 
motives,  mifreprefent  the  condud  of  a  foreign  nation,  prefent  an 
unnatural  and  diftorted  view  of  fads,  appeal  to  the  publick  paffions, 
attempt  to  filence  aUjf|jj||jfion,  reprefent  our  ability  to  wage  war 
in  a  moft  extravagant  «J(fcftagnify  our  means  of  injuring  our  en 
emy,  and  diminifti  her  power  and  ability  to  injure  us,  and  efpecially 
if  all  this  be  done  while  the  queftion  is  ft  ill  open,  and  before  the 
Legislature,  who  are  alone  authorized  to  decide  it,  are  convened — 
it  is  the  mo&folemn  duty  which  a  citizen  is  ever  called  upon  to  exer- 
cife,  to  corred  fuch  falfe  ftatements,  to  remove  erroneous  impref- 
fions,  and  to  endeavour  to  condud  his  fellow-citizens  from  the  mazy 
labyrinth  of  error  and  prejudice,  into  the  paths  of  light  and  truth. 
Such  an  office  I  have,  with  confcious  inability,  attempted  to  exe 
cute  : — Happy,  if  my  feeble  efforts  mall  in  any  degree  contribute 
to  preferve  my  beloved  country  from  the  dangers  which  furround  it. 


* 


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• 


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#  1940 


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APR    3 





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REC'D 


t>Efr 


4  m;My 


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o    . 


JAN  14  1977 


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LD  21-100m-7,'39(402s) 


I    LJ 


397349 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


r    urc-d"  C". 


